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CVE-2026-126357: 
JavaScript Análise e mitigação de vulnerabilidades

Visão geral

CVE-2026-126357 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the Hono web application framework affecting the mount() and app.mount() functions. It allows unauthenticated remote attackers to bypass path-scoped middleware (such as authentication or authorization checks) by crafting malicious request paths that exploit improper prefix removal logic. All versions of Hono prior to 4.13.16 are affected (npm package hono). The vulnerability was published on November 1, 2026, and assigned a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.3 (Medium) (Github Advisory, Hono Release).

Detalhes técnicos

The vulnerability is classified as CWE-288 (Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel) and stems from two distinct flaws in how mount() and app.mount() strip the mount prefix before forwarding requests to mounted sub-applications (Github Advisory):

  1. Dynamic prefix length bug (all affected versions): For dynamic mount patterns like /api/:tenant/*, the prefix was removed using the route pattern's character length rather than the actual matched prefix length. A request such as /api/a/xxxxx/admin/secret (where the tenant segment is shorter than the pattern token) would be truncated incorrectly, forwarding /admin/secret to the mounted app — bypassing any outer middleware protecting /api/:tenant/admin/*.
  2. Path re-normalization bug (since 4.12.21): The forwarded URL was reconstructed from the decoded request pathname and assigned to url.pathname. This caused encoded backslashes (%5C) to be decoded into forward slashes (/) and .. sequences to be collapsed, enabling path traversal. For example, /app/public%5C..%5Cadmin/secret would reach the mounted app as /admin/secret.

No user interaction or privileges are required; the attack is conducted entirely over the network with low complexity (Github Advisory, Fix Commit).

Impacto

An unauthenticated attacker can reach routes within a mounted Hono sub-application that are intended to be protected by path-scoped middleware (e.g., authentication or authorization checks) registered on the outer application. Because the outer application routes on the original path, the middleware is never invoked for the crafted request, granting unauthorized read access to protected resources. The primary impact is a confidentiality breach (low, per CVSS), with no direct integrity or availability impact; however, depending on what the protected routes expose, the practical impact could be significantly higher — including access to sensitive administrative endpoints or user data (Github Advisory, Hono Release).

Explorabilidade

There is no public proof-of-concept exploit code and no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation at the time of disclosure (Feedly). The EPSS score is 0.0, indicating a very low current probability of exploitation. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. Despite the lack of active exploitation, the attack requires no authentication, no user interaction, and low complexity, making it straightforward to exploit once an attacker understands the path manipulation mechanics (Github Advisory).

Etapas de exploração

  1. Reconnaissance: Identify applications built with Hono (npm package hono < 4.13.16) that use mount() or app.mount() with dynamic route prefixes (e.g., /api/:tenant/*) and rely on outer path-scoped middleware for authentication or authorization.
  2. Identify protected routes: Determine which sub-paths inside the mount prefix are protected by middleware (e.g., /api/:tenant/admin/* protected by an auth check).
  3. Craft a bypass path (Dynamic prefix bug): Send a request where the first dynamic segment differs in length from the route pattern token. For example, for a mount on /api/:tenant/*, send a request to /api/a/xxxxx/admin/secret — the prefix removal uses the pattern length (:tenant = 7 chars) rather than the actual matched value (a = 1 char), causing the mounted app to receive /admin/secret while the outer middleware never runs.
  4. Craft a bypass path (Re-normalization bug, versions ≥ 4.12.21): Send a request with an encoded backslash or dot-dot sequence, such as /app/public%5C..%5Cadmin/secret. The URL re-normalization decodes %5C to \, which becomes /, and collapses .., forwarding /admin/secret to the mounted app.
  5. Access protected resource: The mounted application receives the crafted path as a legitimate request to the protected route (e.g., /admin/secret) without any authentication middleware having been applied, granting unauthorized access (Github Advisory, Fix Commit).

Indicadores de compromisso

  • Network: HTTP requests to mounted application paths where the URL contains encoded backslashes (%5C), double-encoded dot segments (%252e), or path segments that appear inconsistent with the dynamic route pattern (e.g., unusually short or long tenant/parameter segments followed by sensitive sub-paths like /admin/ or /secret/).
  • Logs: Access log entries showing requests to protected sub-paths (e.g., /admin/*) that returned HTTP 200 instead of the expected 401/403; requests containing %5C, ..%5C, or %252e%252e in the URL path targeting mounted application prefixes.
  • Application Behavior: Successful responses from routes that should require authentication, particularly for requests originating from unauthenticated sessions or unknown IP addresses targeting administrative or sensitive endpoints within mounted sub-applications (Github Advisory).

Mitigação e soluções alternativas

Patch: Upgrade the hono npm package to version 4.13.16 or later. The fix rewrites prefix removal to strip the mount prefix segment by segment from the raw (undecoded) pathname using the actual matched parameter values, preventing both the dynamic prefix length bug and the re-normalization bypass (Hono Release, Fix Commit).

Workaround (if immediate upgrade is not possible): Register authentication and authorization middleware inside the mounted application rather than relying solely on path-scoped middleware in the outer application. This ensures the middleware runs regardless of how the path is forwarded (Github Advisory).

Note: After upgrading, route patterns with a wildcard inside the last segment (e.g., /assets*) or duplicate parameter names will now throw an error — review and update any such route definitions.

Reações da comunidade

The advisory was published by Hono maintainer yusukebe and credited four independent reporters (KunalShukla-Al, seslo82, kian0417, zachary-satterly), suggesting the issue was discovered through coordinated responsible disclosure (Github Advisory). The v4.13.16 release notes highlight this as one of five security fixes bundled in the same release, and the maintainers explicitly encouraged all users relying on path-scoped middleware with mount() to upgrade immediately (Hono Release). No significant broader media coverage or notable social media discussion has been identified at this time.

Recursos adicionais

Status correto da distribuição Linux

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RHEL / CentOS

Afetado

RHEL 10

Não Afetado

Origem: Este relatório foi gerado usando IA

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