CVE-2026-54458: 
PHP Análisis y mitigación de vulnerabilidades

CVE-2026-54458 is an unauthenticated stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the YPTSocket plugin of WWBN AVideo, allowing any unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the authenticated browser session of every administrator viewing a page that renders the YPTSocket online-users debug panel. The vulnerability was published on June 4, 2026, and affects AVideo version 29.0 and earlier. It carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.6 (Critical) (GitHub Advisory).

The root cause is CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation), with two unsanitized attacker-controlled parameters — webSocketSelfURI and page_title — being stored and broadcast to all connected clients. The getWebSocket.json.php endpoint issues a signed WebSocket token to any anonymous caller (the only gate is whether the YPTSocket plugin is enabled), and MessageSQLiteV2::onOpen reads webSocketSelfURI and page_title from the WebSocket connection URL query string without validation, persisting both verbatim into an in-memory SQLite connections table. The broadcast helper dbGetUniqueUsers() returns these unescaped values as part of the users_id_online JSON frame sent to every connected client; on the client side, script.js::updateSocketUserCard interpolates page_title into an HTML template literal passed to jQuery's $.append(html), which parses attacker-supplied bytes into live DOM nodes — including <img> tags with inline onerror event handlers — executing arbitrary JavaScript in the admin's authenticated origin (GitHub Advisory, Fix Commit).

Successful exploitation allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the authenticated AVideo origin of every administrator currently viewing a page with the YPTSocket debug panel rendered. The attacker's script can read non-HttpOnly cookies and CSRF tokens from the admin dashboard, issue authenticated requests to any admin-only endpoint, exfiltrate the admin dashboard DOM, and chain into any admin-context mutation — effectively achieving full administrative takeover of the AVideo instance via the victim admin's own session (GitHub Advisory).

1. Reconnaissance: Identify an AVideo instance with the YPTSocket plugin enabled (default after plugin activation) and confirm at least one administrator is actively browsing the platform.
2. Obtain anonymous WebSocket token: Send an unauthenticated HTTP GET request to /plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php?webSocketSelfURI=/dashboard?x=1 to receive a signed WebSocket URL in the JSON response — no credentials required.
3. Craft malicious WebSocket URL: Append the attacker-controlled page_title parameter containing an XSS payload (e.g., <img src=x onerror=...> with String.fromCharCode-encoded strings to avoid quote/backtick characters) to the returned WebSocket URL, along with the webSocketSelfURI parameter.
4. Connect and inject payload: Open a WebSocket connection to the crafted URL. The server's MessageSQLiteV2::onOpen stores the malicious page_title verbatim in the in-memory SQLite connections table.
5. Payload broadcast: The server's dbGetUniqueUsers() broadcasts the stored page_title to all connected clients in the next broadcast cycle via the users_id_online JSON frame.
6. XSS execution in admin context: Every administrator tab rendering the YPTSocket debug panel receives the broadcast; script.js::updateSocketUserCard interpolates the malicious page_title into a jQuery $.append(html) call, causing the browser to parse and execute the attacker's JavaScript within the admin's authenticated AVideo origin, enabling session hijacking, CSRF token theft, or admin action execution (GitHub Advisory).

• Network: Unauthenticated HTTP GET requests to /plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php with unusual or external webSocketSelfURI query parameters; anonymous WebSocket connections to the AVideo WebSocket port carrying page_title parameters containing HTML tags or JavaScript-like strings (e.g., <img, onerror, String.fromCharCode).
• Logs: Web server access logs showing anonymous (no session cookie) requests to getWebSocket.json.php followed immediately by WebSocket upgrade requests with encoded page_title values; repeated WebSocket connections from the same IP with varying payloads.
• Application Behavior: Administrators reporting unexpected page behavior (e.g., background color changes, tab title modifications) while viewing AVideo pages with the YPTSocket footer loaded; unexpected JavaScript errors or network requests originating from admin browser sessions to external domains.
• File System: No file-system artifacts expected for this in-memory/DOM-based attack; however, review plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLiteV2.php and plugin/YPTSocket/script.js for unauthorized modifications (GitHub Advisory).

The fix is available in commit 8be71e5 for the AVideo repository, which validates webSocketSelfURI against FILTER_VALIDATE_URL and a strict ^https?:// regex before accepting it, and replaces the unsafe utf8_encode call on page_title with htmlspecialchars(..., ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5, 'UTF-8') to properly HTML-encode the value before storage. As of the advisory publication date (June 4, 2026), no patched release version beyond the commit has been formally tagged — administrators should apply the patch commit directly or monitor for an updated release. As an immediate workaround, disabling the YPTSocket plugin or setting debugSocket=false in the plugin configuration will prevent the vulnerable debug panel from rendering in admin sessions (Fix Commit, GitHub Advisory).

The vulnerability was reported by security researcher arkmarta and published by AVideo maintainer DanielnetoDotCom on June 4, 2026, with a detailed advisory and PoC included in the official GitHub Security Advisory. No broader media coverage or notable community commentary beyond the advisory itself has been identified at this time (GitHub Advisory).