CVE-2026-111943: 
Go Analyse et atténuation de la vulnérabilité

Aperçu

CVE-2026-111943 is an improper certificate validation vulnerability in the Go standard library's crypto/x509 package, enabling man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks via compromised intermediate certificates from the Indian Certificate Authority eMudhra (emsign). The vulnerability arises because on some platforms, system trust stores may not be automatically updated to distrust eMudhra's eight compromised intermediate CA certificates — whose private keys were found to be recoverable due to flawed key generation (weak P-384 entropy). Go addressed this by adding a denylist in crypto/x509 that causes Verify() to return an error when any of these known-compromised intermediates appear in a certificate chain. Affected versions are Go crypto/x509 before 1.26.10 and 1.27.0-0 through before 1.27.3. The vulnerability was published on October 20, 2026, with patches released the same day. It carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.8 (Medium) (Red Hat CVE, Openwall OSS-Sec, Red Hat Bugzilla).

Détails techniques

The root cause is classified under CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) and CWE-299 (Improper Check for Certificate Revocation). eMudhra's eight intermediate CA private keys were recoverable from public certificates due to critically weak key generation — reportedly, at least one key's private scalar was as trivial as the integer 4. Because Go applications on some platforms (particularly those with embedded or bundled trust stores, or platforms where OS trust store updates are not automatic) continued to trust these compromised intermediates, an attacker in possession of the recovered private keys could forge TLS certificates for any domain chained under those intermediates. The Go fix introduces a hardcoded denylist in crypto/x509 that rejects certificate chains containing any of the eight identified compromised eMudhra intermediate certificates, regardless of whether the system trust store has been updated. The relevant Go issue is tracked at go.dev/issue/82345 and the code change at go.dev/cl/851047 (Openwall OSS-Sec, Red Hat Bugzilla).

Impact

An unauthenticated network attacker who has recovered one or more of the eight compromised eMudhra intermediate CA private keys can forge TLS certificates for arbitrary domains, enabling MitM attacks against any application using an affected Go version for TLS certificate verification. This allows interception and decryption of encrypted communications, with high confidentiality and integrity impact (CVSS C:H/I:H). Availability is not directly impacted. The scope extends to any Go application — including widely deployed tools such as Docker, Terraform, Kubernetes components, and others — that performs TLS certificate validation using the affected crypto/x509 library, particularly where system trust stores have not been updated to revoke the compromised intermediates (Red Hat CVE, Red Hat Bugzilla).

Exploitabilité

No confirmed in-the-wild exploitation has been reported as of the time of this report. The EPSS score is 0.00145 (approximately 0.15%), indicating low near-term exploitation probability. A GitHub repository (phpc0de/CVE-2026-111943-Remediator) exists but has been assessed as a detection and remediation scanner, not an exploit. The vulnerability is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog. However, the underlying eMudhra private key compromise is a real-world event — major browsers (Mozilla, Google Chrome, Apple Safari) and Microsoft have all moved to block the compromised certificates, indicating the keys are genuinely recoverable and the threat is credible. The attack requires user interaction (a victim must connect to a MitM-controlled endpoint) and high attack complexity, limiting automated exploitation (Red Hat CVE, Openwall OSS-Sec).

Étapes d’exploitation

  1. Obtain compromised intermediate CA private key: Recover one of the eight eMudhra intermediate CA private keys from publicly available certificates using the known weak key generation flaw (e.g., trivially small private scalar values such as the integer 4).
  2. Forge a TLS certificate: Use the recovered intermediate CA private key to sign a fraudulent TLS certificate for a target domain (e.g., bank.example.com), creating a certificate chain that appears valid under the compromised eMudhra intermediate.
  3. Position for MitM: Set up a network interception point (e.g., via ARP spoofing, DNS hijacking, BGP hijacking, or a rogue Wi-Fi access point) to redirect victim traffic to an attacker-controlled server.
  4. Present forged certificate: Configure the attacker-controlled TLS server to present the forged certificate. Victims running Go applications on unpatched versions (before 1.26.10 or 1.27.3) whose system trust stores have not been updated will accept the certificate as valid.
  5. Intercept encrypted traffic: Decrypt and inspect or modify the victim's TLS-encrypted communications, exfiltrating credentials, session tokens, or sensitive data (Openwall OSS-Sec, Red Hat Bugzilla).

Indicateurs de compromis

  • Network: Unexpected TLS certificates presented by servers that chain to eMudhra/emsign intermediate CAs (check certificate transparency logs and TLS inspection for chains involving the eight revoked intermediates); anomalous DNS or ARP responses redirecting traffic to unexpected IP addresses.
  • Logs: TLS handshake errors or unexpected certificate validation failures in application logs after patching (indicating previously accepted compromised chains are now blocked); certificate transparency monitoring alerts for newly issued certificates under the compromised eMudhra intermediates.
  • File System: Go binaries compiled with versions prior to 1.26.10 or 1.27.3 present in production environments (identifiable via go version -m <binary> or scanner tools such as those provided by Qualys and Nessus).
  • Process/Application: Go applications that perform TLS verification without upgrading to patched versions, particularly those with embedded trust stores (e.g., statically compiled binaries) that bypass OS-level trust store updates (Red Hat Bugzilla).

Atténuation et solutions de contournement

The primary remediation is to upgrade Go to version 1.26.10 or 1.27.3 (or later), which include the crypto/x509 denylist blocking the eight compromised eMudhra intermediate certificates. All Go applications must be recompiled with the patched Go toolchain, as the denylist is embedded in the Go binary — updating the OS trust store alone is insufficient for statically compiled Go binaries. Additionally, ensure system root certificate stores are updated on all platforms to distrust the compromised eMudhra/emsign intermediates (Mozilla, Chrome, Apple, and Microsoft have all issued trust store updates). Red Hat has issued numerous errata (RHSA-2026:86093 through RHSA-2026:93617 and beyond) covering RHEL 8, 9, 10, OpenShift, and related products. SUSE, Amazon Linux, Debian, AlmaLinux, and other distributions have also released patches (Openwall OSS-Sec, Red Hat Bugzilla, Red Hat CVE).

Réactions de la communauté

The eMudhra CA key compromise generated significant industry attention. Mozilla, Google (Chrome), Apple, and Microsoft all moved rapidly to block the compromised certificates in their respective trust stores, with browser vendors issuing emergency OneCRL/CRLSet updates. The Go team issued an emergency point release (Go 1.27.3 and 1.26.10) within the same day as public disclosure. Forrester published a blog post calling the incident "a wake-up call for enterprise PKI." Cisco Talos published a technical analysis of the compromised intermediate certificates. Qualys released operational detection tools and a blog post explaining how to identify affected systems. The story was widely covered by BleepingComputer, The Hacker News, Heise, and numerous security blogs. Community discussion on Hacker News was active, with developers noting the unusual nature of the fix (a hardcoded denylist in the Go standard library) and the implications for statically compiled Go binaries that require recompilation rather than just OS-level trust store updates (BleepingComputer, Openwall OSS-Sec).

Ressources supplémentaires

État de correction de la distribution Linux

Corrigez la disponibilité entre les grandes distributions Linux et leurs versions.

Debian

Affecté

bookworm

golang-1.19

Affecté

sid

golang-1.27: 1.27.3-1

Fixé

trixie

golang-1.24

Affecté

Ubuntu

Inconnu

devel

golang-1.26

Inconnu

jammy

golang-1.24

Inconnu

jammy (esm-apps)

golang-1.24

Inconnu

noble

golang-1.24

Inconnu

noble (esm-apps)

golang-1.24

Inconnu

resolute

golang-1.24

Inconnu

RHEL / CentOS

Fixé

OpenShift

el8:cri-o-0:1.25.5-38.rhaos4.12.git2e7f657.el8.src

Fixé

RHEL 8

:appstream:container-tools:rhel8:8100020261023082046:afee755d/cockpit-podman-0:8100020261023082046.afee755d.src

Fixé

RHEL 9

:appstream:delve-0:1.26.1-1.el9_2.2.src

Fixé

RHEL 10

delve-0:1.26.1-3.el10_0.src

Fixé

Alpine

Fixé

edge

docker-cli-buildx: 0.38.1-r0, 5.6.1-r0, 29.9.2-r0, 1.27.3-r0

Fixé

Source: Ce rapport a été généré à l’aide de l’IA

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