CVE-2026-129851: 
Wolfi Analyse et atténuation de la vulnérabilité

Aperçu

CVE-2026-129851 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in SeaweedFS's VolumeServer.FetchAndWriteNeedle gRPC method that allows unauthenticated network attackers to bypass the incomplete fix for CVE-2026-73080. All SeaweedFS versions before 4.42 (including 4.41 and master) are affected. The vulnerability was published on November 16, 2026, with the security advisory originally filed on September 11, 2026. It carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (Medium) and a CVSS v4.0 base score of 6.9 (Medium) (GitHub Advisory, GitHub Advisory GHSA).

Détails techniques

The root cause (CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery) lies in the FetchAndWriteNeedle handler in weed/server/volume_grpc_remote.go. The prior CVE-2026-73080 fix added endpoint validation only for S3-compatible backends, leaving three sibling attack surfaces unguarded in the same handler: (1) replicas[].url entries are passed directly into fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/%s?type=replicate", targetVolumeServer, fileId.String()) and UploadData without any checkBlockedIP call, allowing an attacker to control the host, port, path, query, Authorization header (via req.Auth), and POST body; (2) the azure_endpoint field is honored by the Azure SDK and dials the attacker-supplied URL over HTTPS, bypassing the S3-only guard; (3) the gcs_google_application_credentials field accepts a local filesystem path, and distinct error strings (no such file or directory, permission denied, invalid character) leak file existence and readability as an oracle. Exploitation requires no credentials or TLS — a fully anonymous gRPC connection to the volume server's default port (18080) suffices, and the target volume ID can be obtained via an unauthenticated GET /dir/assign call to the master (GitHub Advisory, Vulnerable Source).

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can cause the SeaweedFS volume server to issue attacker-shaped HTTP(S) requests — with controlled path, query string, Authorization header, and body — to internal services, loopback addresses, and cloud instance metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254 for AWS IMDS credential theft). Gap 1 (replica URL) is a blind write/trigger primitive against internal HTTP APIs; Gap 2 (Azure endpoint) enables HTTPS SSRF to otherwise-blocked addresses; Gap 3 (GCS credentials path) provides a local filesystem oracle that can enumerate mounted secrets and confirm credential file locations. The combination enables unauthorized access to internal systems, potential cloud credential theft via IMDS, and manipulation of internal services that trust network position (GitHub Advisory).

Exploitabilité

A proof-of-concept advisory with concrete reproduction steps — including specific gRPC request fields, a crafted replica URL using the ?a= query-swallowing trick, Docker setup commands, and expected outputs — is publicly available in the SeaweedFS security advisory. The exploit requires no authentication, no user interaction, and is automatable (NVD SSVC: automatable=yes). The advisory author verified the exploit end-to-end against the shipped chrislusf/seaweedfs:4.41 Docker image. A self-contained Go client demonstrating all three gaps is available on request from the reporter. There is no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation at this time, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. The EPSS score is 0.0 (GitHub Advisory, Feedly).

Étapes d’exploitation

  1. Reconnaissance: Identify internet- or network-exposed SeaweedFS volume server gRPC ports (default 18080, calculated as 10000 + volume port). Confirm the version is ≤ 4.41 via banner or API responses.
  2. Obtain a valid volume ID: Send an unauthenticated HTTP GET to the master API: GET http://<master>:9333/dir/assign. This returns a volume ID and file ID without any credentials.
  3. Establish an anonymous gRPC connection: Connect to the volume server gRPC port using grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()) with no metadata or TLS.
  4. Craft the SSRF payload (Gap 1 — replica URL): Send a FetchAndWriteNeedle gRPC request with volume_id set to the obtained volume ID, a benign remote_conf (e.g., type: "s3", s3_endpoint pointing to a public or TEST-NET-1 host to pass the S3 guard), auth: "ATTACKER-SUPPLIED-TOKEN", and replicas: [{url: "127.0.0.1:7000/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/?a="}]. The trailing ?a= swallows the appended ?type=replicate query parameter.
  5. Observe the forged request: The volume server issues a POST to http://127.0.0.1:7000/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/?a=/1,...?type=replicate with Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER-SUPPLIED-TOKEN and the attacker-controlled body — reaching the IMDS or any internal HTTP service.
  6. Exploit Gap 2 (Azure HTTPS SSRF): Alternatively, set remote_conf.type="azure" and azure_endpoint="https://169.254.169.254/" to trigger HTTPS SSRF to otherwise-blocked addresses.
  7. Exploit Gap 3 (filesystem oracle): Set gcs_google_application_credentials to a local path (e.g., /etc/shadow) and distinguish file states from error strings: invalid character = exists and readable; no such file or directory = absent; permission denied = exists but not readable (GitHub Advisory).

Indicateurs de compromis

  • Network: Unexpected outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests from the SeaweedFS volume server to 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, or internal RFC 1918 addresses on non-standard ports; POST requests with multipart/form-data bodies and Authorization: Bearer <attacker-token> headers to internal services.
  • Network: Inbound anonymous gRPC connections (no TLS, no metadata) to the volume server gRPC port (default 18080) from unexpected source IPs.
  • Logs: Volume server logs showing FetchAndWriteNeedle RPC calls with replicas[].url values containing paths, query strings, or IP addresses inconsistent with known peer volume servers (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 169.254.x.x, or entries containing ?a=).
  • Logs: Internal service access logs showing POST requests to paths like /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ with Host: 127.0.0.1:<port> and Content-Type: multipart/form-data originating from the volume server process.
  • Logs: GCS credential errors in volume server logs referencing unexpected local paths (/etc/shadow, /etc/hostname, etc.) with messages like failed to read credentials file: permission denied or failed to parse credentials: invalid character.
  • Process: The SeaweedFS volume server process initiating outbound TCP connections to loopback or link-local addresses (GitHub Advisory).

Atténuation et solutions de contournement

Upgrade SeaweedFS to version 4.42 or later, which includes two patches: commit d713ab4 validates all replicas[].url entries as bare host:port (rejecting loopback, link-local, and IMDS addresses while allowing RFC 1918 peer volume servers) and restricts gcs_google_application_credentials to inline JSON only; commit 9125b9c extends the remote-endpoint guard to the Azure backend when azure_endpoint is set. As interim mitigations: implement network segmentation to prevent the volume server from reaching 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, and internal-only services; apply authentication and authorization controls on the volume server gRPC port (e.g., configure security.toml and -whiteList); and monitor outbound requests from volume servers for anomalous destinations (SeaweedFS Release 4.42, Patch Commit 1, Patch Commit 2).

Réactions de la communauté

The vulnerability was reported by researcher jh4nks and published by SeaweedFS maintainer chrislusf via the GitHub security advisory program. The advisory is notable for its thoroughness — it includes a working Docker-based reproduction environment, a negative control demonstrating the original CVE-2026-73080 fix still works for the patched leg, and three distinct exploitation gaps with concrete expected outputs. No significant broader media coverage or social media discussion has been identified beyond the advisory and standard vulnerability database aggregators (GitHub Advisory).

Ressources supplémentaires


Source: Ce rapport a été généré à l’aide de l’IA

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