
PEACH
Un cadre d’isolation des locataires
CVE-2026-85747 is a manifest digest verification bypass vulnerability in the Distribution toolkit (the OCI/Docker container registry library). The registry/client.(*manifests).Get() function fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body against the requested digest, allowing a malicious or intercepted registry to substitute arbitrary manifest content while the Docker-Content-Digest header claims the correct value. Affected versions are github.com/distribution/distribution/v3 prior to 3.1.2 and github.com/docker/distribution up to and including v2.8.3. The vulnerability was disclosed on September 23, 2026, and published to the GitHub Advisory Database on October 15, 2026. It carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.8 (Medium) (Github Advisory, GitHub Security Advisory).
The root cause is classified as CWE-354 (Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value). In registry/client/repository.go (lines 488–505), the response body is read and passed directly to distribution.UnmarshalManifest without computing digest.FromBytes(body) and comparing it against the caller-supplied digest. The Docker-Content-Digest response header is parsed only to populate an out-parameter (ReturnContentDigest) and is never recomputed from the body — a lying server can set it to any value while delivering different bytes. The bundled pull-through proxy in registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go (lines 42–87) calls remoteManifests.Get(ctx, dgst) and immediately writes the result to local storage with no re-verification, enabling permanent cache poisoning of the mirror. A complete, runnable Go PoC (main.go) is publicly available in the security advisory, demonstrating the bypass using an httptest.NewServer that serves a forged manifest with a spoofed Docker-Content-Digest header (Github Advisory, GitHub Security Advisory).
Successful exploitation allows an attacker to silently substitute arbitrary container image manifest content — including changing image layers, entrypoints, or referenced blobs — for any client performing digest-pinned pulls. The scope is changed (CVSS S:C) because the pull-through proxy can cache and re-serve the poisoned manifest to all downstream consumers, amplifying the impact beyond the initially targeted client. Affected asset classes include image policy controllers enforcing allowed digests, pull-through cache/mirror implementations, and CI/CD pipelines that pin images by digest for supply-chain integrity. There is no confidentiality or availability impact, but the integrity impact is high, as the fundamental guarantee of content-addressable digest pinning is completely undermined (Github Advisory, GitHub Security Advisory).
A complete, runnable proof-of-concept exploit written in Go is publicly available within the GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3), confirmed with high confidence by Feedly's exploit analysis. The PoC demonstrates the bypass against github.com/docker/distribution v2.8.3+incompatible using a mock malicious registry server. As of the time of reporting, there is no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation. The EPSS score is approximately 0.218% (12th percentile), indicating a low but non-negligible probability of exploitation in the near term. The vulnerability is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog, and no threat actor attribution has been reported (Github Advisory, GitHub Security Advisory).
trustedManifest (the content the victim expects, whose SHA-256 digest is the pinned value) and an evilManifest (attacker-controlled content with different layer/config references). Compute pinnedDigest = sha256(trustedManifest) and evilDigest = sha256(evilManifest).GET /v2/{name}/manifests/{pinnedDigest}, intercept or handle the request at the attacker-controlled registry endpoint.Content-Type: application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.v2+json, Docker-Content-Digest: {pinnedDigest} (forged to match what was requested), and a body containing the bytes of evilManifest.registry/client.(*manifests).Get() reads the body and passes it to distribution.UnmarshalManifest without hashing it against pinnedDigest. The attacker's manifest is returned to the caller as if it were the pinned content.registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go), the poisoned manifest is written to local storage and re-served to all downstream clients without re-verification, permanently injecting the malicious manifest into the mirror cache (Github Advisory, GitHub Security Advisory).GET /v2/{name}/manifests/{digest} requests where the Docker-Content-Digest response header value does not match the SHA-256 hash of the response body; outbound connections from registry hosts to unexpected upstream endpoints.The primary remediation is to upgrade to github.com/distribution/distribution/v3 version 3.1.2 or later, which adds explicit digest verification in registry/client.(*manifests).Get() by computing dgst.Verifier() over the response body before passing it to UnmarshalManifest, and similarly hardens blobs.Get(). The legacy github.com/docker/distribution module (v2.8.x) has no patched version available; users should migrate to the v3 module. As interim mitigations, enforce TLS with certificate pinning between clients and registries to reduce MITM risk, implement network segmentation to restrict registry access, and independently verify manifest digests on the client side before deploying containers. Monitor pull-through proxy caches for unexpected manifest content (GitHub Release, Github Advisory).
The vulnerability was reported by security researcher KrisKennawayDD and published by maintainer milosgajdos. Coverage appeared in Linux security roundup newsletters and German Linux security news outlet Pro-Linux.de. The fix was merged and released as part of the v3.1.2 patch release, which the maintainers described as a stable release with security fixes. No major vendor statements beyond the GitHub advisory or significant social media controversy have been identified (GitHub Release).
Corrigez la disponibilité entre les grandes distributions Linux et leurs versions.
bionic (esm-apps)
docker-registry
devel
docker-registry
focal (esm-apps)
docker-registry
jammy
docker-registry
jammy (esm-apps)
docker-registry
noble
docker-registry
noble (esm-apps)
docker-registry
resolute
docker-registry
Source: Ce rapport a été généré à l’aide de l’IA
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