GHSA-7gf8-v4c4-pph7: 
JavaScript Analyse et atténuation de la vulnérabilité

Summary

RE2.prototype.split (and String.prototype.split with an RE2 separator) runs in O(n²) time when the leftmost match is zero-width and lies ahead of the cursor. This happens with \b and \B, and with ^/$ under the m flag. Each such match makes the loop emit the single character at the cursor, step forward one character, and search again from there, which finds the same distant match again. A 200,000-character subject (~600 KB of ordinary CJK text) blocks the event loop for about 81 seconds. The built-in engine takes 1 ms. The output is also wrong: one piece per character instead of one piece per boundary. This is the same empty-match iteration family as CVE-2026-68499 (GHSA-6hxr-mr5r-9836). That advisory named split's empty-match guard as the safe model for its fix, but that guard is the root cause here.

Details

Root cause

// lib/split.cc (1.27.0), WrappedRE2::Split
while (byteIndex < str.size && re2->regexp.Match(str, byteIndex, str.size, RE2::UNANCHORED, &groups[0], groups.size()))
{
        if (match.size()) { /* split at the match */ }
        else
        {
                // zero-width match: push ONE character at byteIndex, advance ONE character,
                // regardless of where the match actually is
                size_t sym_size = getUtf8CharSize(str.data[byteIndex], str.size - byteIndex);
                pieces.push_back(re2::StringPiece(str.data + byteIndex, sym_size));
                byteIndex += sym_size;
        }
}

When the empty match is at position m > byteIndex, the match position is ignored. Every iteration rescans [byteIndex, m], so a subject of n characters with one boundary at the end costs about n²/2 character steps. RE2's \b is ASCII-only, so any run of non-ASCII text (Chinese, Japanese, Cyrillic, emoji), whitespace or punctuation is a run with no boundary inside it.

Proof of concept

const RE2 = require('re2');                       // 1.27.0
const s = '中文文本测试内容'.repeat(25000) + 'a';    // 200,001 chars
console.time('re2');    s.split(new RE2('\\b'));  console.timeEnd('re2');     // ~81 s
console.time('native'); s.split(/\b/u);           console.timeEnd('native');  // ~1 ms
'  a'.split(new RE2('\\b'));     // [" ", " ", "a"]   native: ["  ", "a"]
'abc'.split(new RE2('$', 'm'));  // ["a", "b", "c"]   native: ["abc"]

Measured on a clean npm install re2@1.27.0 (stock prebuilt, Node 26, x86-64 Linux):

Impact

Denial of service. The call is synchronous native code, so it blocks the whole event loop, and nothing in JS (a timer, try/catch) can interrupt it. The pattern is usually fixed by the developer, so the only precondition is that an application splits attacker-controlled text with \b, \B or a multiline anchor. split(/\b/) is a common way to tokenize words, and the trigger is any long run of non-ASCII text, which is ordinary input for non-English users. A single request of about 1 MB costs minutes of CPU, and repeated requests keep a worker blocked. Bounded per request: unlike CVE-2026-68499 it terminates, and memory stays linear. Implement ECMAScript SplitMatcher semantics. Keep p (end of the last split) and q (search start) separate. Use each match at its real position. When an empty match is at p, or any match is at the very end, advance q by one code point instead of splitting. q never moves backwards, so the loop is linear. Patch: q3_split_quadratic.patch (applies to 1.27.0; the 1.27.0 test suite passes). It also fixes the output: split(/\b/), ^/$ (m), (a)? and (a)| now match the built-in engine.

size_t p = 0, q = 0;
while (q < str.size && re2->regexp.Match(str, q, str.size, RE2::UNANCHORED, &groups[0], groups.size()))
{
        size_t m = match.data() - str.data, e = m + match.size();
        if (m >= str.size) break;                                                    // a match at the end never splits
        if (e == p) { q = m + getUtf8CharSize(str.data[m], str.size - m); continue; } // empty match at p
        pieces.push_back(re2::StringPiece(str.data + p, m - p));
        if (pieces.size() >= limit) break;
        pieces.insert(pieces.end(), groups.begin() + 1, groups.end());
        if (pieces.size() >= limit) break;
        p = q = e;
}
if (str.size && pieces.size() < limit) pieces.push_back(re2::StringPiece(str.data + p, str.size - p));

Workaround: don't split untrusted text with \b, \B or multiline anchors. Use matchAll with a consuming pattern such as /\w+|\W+/g instead.