
Cloud Vulnerability DB
A community-led vulnerabilities database
Core half fixed in freenet/freenet-core#6103, merged as 256bd60955ece72bb770f029bdfc41ad0545f32d. It shipped in v0.2.155.
ApplicationMessage. This is an allowlist: future variants are refused by default.dispatch_delegate_request on a network node, and Executor::client_delegate_request for local mode (run_local_node, handle_request). Local mode previously had no refusal at all.Executor::delegate_request and delegate_request_as are now pub(in crate::contract).ContractNotification / contract response / UserResponse / DelegateMessage can no longer reach River's chat delegate or any other delegate from a client. The River-side hardening suggested above (re-read the contract rather than trusting new_state) becomes defence in depth. It is tracked, with the low-severity MessageV1.room_owner replay note, in freenet/river#854.Found during the freenet-agent-skills audit (2026-11-02). Confirmed from source at freenet-core 057fc222f7 and river 7666a57e79. Nothing has been exercised: no test reproduces it yet.
carries_host_only_inbound (crates/core/src/contract.rs:4954) refuses a client's ApplicationMessages carrying Lifecycle or WakeupFired. Its doc comment gives the reason: the delegate cannot tell a forged message from a real one. That reason applies equally to other node-delivered variants.
wasm_runtime/delegate/interface.rs:227-254 forwards PutContractResponse, UpdateContractResponse, SubscribeContractResponse, ContractNotification and DelegateMessage to the WASM verbatim. GetContractResponse and UserResponse have their own arms at :177-226 with the same effect. The native client encoding is chosen by the client (websocket.rs:770) and decodes every variant. The flatbuffers decoder is narrower and was not traced.
So a web app on the node, or an unattested client (origin None), appears able to hand a delegate a ContractNotification with a chosen contract_id and new_state, or a GetContractResponse with a chosen context and state.
delegates/chat-delegate/src/lib.rs:63-69 dispatches ContractNotification before check_origin, with the comment that the runtime is the sender. subscription.rs:297-456 decodes notification.new_state and trusts its member list. If the list differs from the cache in a private room, it loads the owner signing key, signs a rotation and encrypts the room secret to every member_vk in that list. It also recovers prior-version secrets from the encrypted_secrets in that same state.
Preconditions: a page on the room owner's node and the room's contract id, which is public. The reverse index and subscription context must also exist.
Not traced: whether the room contract refuses a blob for a non-member. That decides whether this is a secret leak or forced rotation and churn. Forced rotation is the floor. A throwaway test is needed.
Also low, River: MessageV1.room_owner is signed but never compared with parameters, so cross-room message replay is stopped only by per-room member keys.
ApplicationMessage from clients, after checking that no legitimate client sends UserResponse or DelegateMessage this way. ghostkeys' del_msg.sender comment suggests that case was considered.new_state.
A diff adding a gate points straight at what was ungated, so consider the private fork for the fix.
[AI-assisted - Claude]Source: NVD
Free Vulnerability Assessment
Evaluate your cloud security practices across 9 security domains to benchmark your risk level and identify gaps in your defenses.
Get a personalized demo
"Best User Experience I have ever seen, provides full visibility to cloud workloads."
"Wiz provides a single pane of glass to see what is going on in our cloud environments."
"We know that if Wiz identifies something as critical, it actually is."