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ferrohealth-smart lets a product trust several authorization servers through [[auth.issuer]] entries. Each token is checked against the entry its iss names, but two [auth] lists are section-level and AuthSection::resolve copied each of them into every issuer's settings:
scopeless_subjects (since 0.1.0). A token whose sub equals an entry, and which carries no resource scope, is granted system-wide access: under the SMART on openEHR requirement it reaches every EHR, template, composition and query of the guarded surface without a scope. The list held bare sub values with no issuer, so a token from any trusted issuer whose sub equals an entry received that grant. A sub is only unique within its issuer (RFC 7519 §4.1.2, RFC 9068 §2.2), so an issuer other than the one the entry was written for can mint, or let a tenant administrator or a self-registered client obtain, a token with that sub.role_claims (since 0.7.0). The claims a token's roles are read from were read from tokens of every trusted issuer. Any trusted issuer could therefore assert any role a product checks, including a product's administrator role (FerroEHR's admin_role defaults to ADMIN) and its emergency-access roles.
The result is an authorization bypass across trust domains (CWE-863): the less trusted of several issuers controls the key the grant is decided on (CWE-639).
Conditions for exposure. Both need a product configured with more than one [[auth.issuer]] entry in JWT mode. The scopeless_subjects weakness also needs a non-empty scopeless_subjects list; the role_claims weakness needs nothing more, since the default list reads roles, groups and entitlements, and a product that grants anything by role. The attacker needs a token accepted from one of the trusted issuers, with a chosen sub or chosen role claims. A deployment with a single issuer, a deployment in mode = "introspection" (one issuer only), Basic users and a product that builds its resource::Settings per issuer itself are not affected.ferrohealth-smart 0.1.0 to 0.8.8 for scopeless_subjects; 0.7.0 to 0.8.8 for role_claims.
Fixed in 0.8.9. An entry of scopeless_subjects or role_claims names its issuer as <issuer>#<value> (an issuer identifier has no fragment, RFC 8414 §2, so the first # ends it), and each issuer's settings receive only the entries that name it. A bare entry still applies when the section trusts exactly one issuer. With several issuers a bare entry, or an entry naming an issuer the section does not trust, refuses the start with a message naming the key and the qualified form. A multi-issuer deployment therefore declares which issuer's subjects and roles count, or sets role_claims = [] to read no roles from a token. The public API is unchanged.
Until you upgrade: trust one issuer per surface; leave scopeless_subjects empty in a multi-issuer configuration; and in a multi-issuer configuration either set role_claims = [] (no role is then read from a token) or make sure every trusted issuer is equally trusted to assert every role the product checks.
Source: NVD
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