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The unauthenticated GET /proxy endpoint of january decodes attacker-supplied images with revolt_files::decode_image. The image/jxl arm sets no size limit, so a 5.6 KB JXL file that declares 12000x12000 pixels makes january allocate memory proportional to the declared pixel count. With a 1 GB memory cap, one request gets the process OOM-killed. The pixel limits (max_mega_pixels, max_pixel_side) apply only in autumn, never on the january path. The earlier SVG advisory (GHSA-x87r-h3mq-7mgr) capped only the SVG arm of the same function.
crates/core/files/src/implementation/media_impl.rs:94-99 (JxlDecoder::new then DynamicImage::from_decoder, no limits)crates/core/files/src/lib.rs:151-175 (decode_image builds a config with max_mega_pixels: 0, max_pixel_side: 0, and nothing enforces them)crates/services/january/src/requests.rs:181 (call site in proxy_file, reachable unauthenticated)cjxl in.ppm real1000.jxl -d 0 -e 1 for 1000x1000 (65 bytes) and the same for 12000x12000 (5601 bytes).Content-Type: image/jxl. (The PoC uses a docker network in 100.64.5.0/24 so the host passes the SSRF blocklist.)GET /proxy?url=http://<attacker>/real1000.jxl returns 200 image/webp. A loopback target returns HTTP 400, so the blocklist works.GET /proxy?url=http://<attacker>/real12000.jxl.The image is rejected, or decoded within a bounded size, as the SVG arm now does (500x500 cap).
The connection is dropped and the container shows oom_killed=true exit=137. A crate-level run showed peak RSS going from about 7 MB to the 1 GB cap on the 5.6 KB input. Tested on v0.16.2 with the packaged PoC; the code path is the same at HEAD, but I did not rerun the PoC at HEAD.
Unauthenticated remote denial of service of the january proxy and embed service from one small request, with memory amplification above 100000x. Larger declared dimensions need proportionally more memory. Repeated requests keep the service down.
Before decoding, read the JXL header dimensions (jxl_oxide::JxlImage::builder exposes them) and reject images above a megapixel and side limit. Alternatively call ImageDecoder::set_limits with image::Limits { max_alloc, .. } before from_decoder. Apply the same limits to every arm of decode_image, not only in autumn.
PoC files for this bug (run.sh, Dockerfile, Dockerfile.jan, attacker.py, poc.rs, the two JXL files, saved output.txt) are available as a zip. I am happy to attach or paste them in a comment on request. Saved output:
--- control 1: loopback target is blocked
HTTP Error 400: Bad Request {"type":"InvalidOperation","location":"crates/services/january/src/requests.rs:463:36"}
--- control 2: benign 1000x1000 JXL (65 bytes) is proxied normally
real1000.jxl 200 image/webp 1868 bytes
january alive=true oom_killed=false
--- attack: JXL of 5601 bytes declaring 12000x12000 (144 MP; autumn's own limit is 40 MP)
real12000.jxl ERR Remote end closed connection without response
january alive=false oom_killed=true exit=137Credit: Zachariah Mithani (AploSec)
Source: NVD
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