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CVE-2026-119760 is a NULL pointer dereference vulnerability in sniproxy through version 0.7.0, affecting the resolv_cancel() function in src/resolv.c. Remote unauthenticated attackers can crash the sniproxy daemon by sending a TLS SNI name or HTTP Host header of exactly 254 or 255 characters that matches a wildcard backend entry, then closing the connection. The vulnerability was disclosed on October 30, 2026, with a patch committed on October 31, 2026. It carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (High) and a CVSS v4.0 base score of 8.7 (High) (GitHub Advisory, VulnCheck).
The root cause is a NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476) arising from a mismatch between hostname length validation and DNS library constraints. The valid_hostname() function in sniproxy accepts hostnames up to 255 characters, but the underlying libudns library rejects names longer than 253 characters (the maximum for DNS text form), causing resolv_query() to return NULL. Despite this failure, resolve_server_address() still sets the connection state to RESOLVING and stores the NULL return value in con->query_handle. When the client subsequently closes the connection, close_client_socket() at connection.c:737-738 unconditionally calls resolv_cancel(con->query_handle) with a NULL argument, and resolv_cancel() at resolv.c:219-224 dereferences the NULL pointer without a guard check, causing a segmentation fault (GitHub Issue #411, connection.c source, resolv.c source). The attack requires no authentication, no user interaction, and works against both TLS (SNI) and HTTP (Host header) listeners configured with a wildcard (*) backend and DNS resolution enabled.
Successful exploitation results in a complete denial of service — the sniproxy daemon crashes with a segmentation fault, interrupting all proxied connections. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact; the vulnerability is limited to availability. Any service relying on sniproxy for TLS SNI routing or HTTP proxying would be rendered unavailable until the daemon is restarted, and the attack can be repeated to prevent recovery (GitHub Advisory, VulnCheck).
No public proof-of-concept exploit code has been observed, and there is no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation at this time (GitHub Advisory). The vulnerability is rated as automatable by NVD SSVC analysis, meaning it can be reliably triggered without manual interaction. The EPSS score is approximately 0.477%, indicating a low but non-negligible probability of exploitation in the near term. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. The attack is trivially reproducible with a short Python script, as demonstrated in the original bug report (GitHub Issue #411).
--enable-dns and configured with a wildcard (.* or *) backend entry that uses DNS resolution.'a'*63 + '.' + 'a'*63 + '.' + 'a'*63 + '.' + 'a'*62).Host: header to an HTTP listener.close_client_socket(), which calls resolv_cancel(NULL).resolv_cancel() causes a segmentation fault, crashing the sniproxy daemon and denying service to all proxied connections (GitHub Issue #411).Failed to submit DNS query: malformed query immediately before a daemon crash; absence of subsequent log entries indicating the process terminated unexpectedly.sniproxy process; core dump files (e.g., core) generated in the sniproxy working directory with a stack trace referencing resolv_cancel at resolv.c:224 and close_client_socket at connection.c:738.The upstream maintainer committed a fix on October 31, 2026 (commit 719fe9a in the main repository), which adds a NULL guard before calling resolv_cancel() and clears con->query_handle after cancellation (GitHub Issue #411). A fork by renaudallard provides two complementary patches: one adding the NULL guard in close_client_socket() (commit d5d7829) and another ensuring resolv_query() properly handles all DNS submission failures and aborts connections cleanly (commit 17986ba). Users should update sniproxy to a version newer than 0.7.0 incorporating these fixes. As a temporary workaround, network-level filtering to block connections with SNI names or HTTP Host headers exceeding 253 characters, or rate limiting inbound connections, can reduce exposure during patching windows.
The vulnerability was identified and reported by renaudallard via GitHub Issue #411 on October 23, 2026, with a detailed reproduction script and stack trace (GitHub Issue #411). The CVE was assigned by VulnCheck and published on October 30, 2026. A Mastodon post by @thehackerwire noted the vulnerability shortly after disclosure. No significant broader media coverage or vendor statements beyond the GitHub issue and advisory have been observed.
Fix availability across major Linux distributions and their releases.
Source: This report was generated using AI
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