Vulnerability DatabaseCVE-2026-123007

CVE-2026-123007: 
NGINX vulnerability analysis and mitigation

Overview

CVE-2026-123007 is a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in NGINX Plus and NGINX Open Source arising from improper HTTP/2 flow control window accounting, colloquially dubbed nginx2root. When NGINX processes specially crafted HTTP/2 traffic, the flow control window can exceed its allowed threshold, triggering an integer underflow that leads to a heap buffer overflow and typically an NGINX worker segmentation fault. Affected versions include NGINX Open Source 1.30.0–1.30.6, 1.31.0–1.31.8, and 1.9.5; NGINX Plus 37.0.0–37.0.8, 37.1.0–37.3.0, and R33. It carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.1 (High) and a CVSS v4.0 base score of 9.2 (Critical) (Github Advisory, RedHat CVE). The vulnerability was published on November 18, 2026 (Github Advisory).

Technical details

The root cause is an integer underflow (CWE-191) in NGINX's HTTP/2 flow control window tracking, which leads to an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) — a heap buffer overflow — when the computed window size wraps around below zero (Github Advisory). An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a sequence of HTTP/2 WINDOW_UPDATE frames with maximal increment values (0x7FFFFFFF) on both the stream and connection levels, driving the server-side flow control accounting past its allowed threshold. The overflow typically causes the NGINX worker process to segfault; on systems where ASLR is disabled or can be bypassed, the memory corruption primitive can be escalated to arbitrary code execution (RedHat CVE). The only precondition is that the target NGINX instance must have HTTP/2 enabled; no authentication or user interaction is required. A public PoC exploit (Python) from Rapid7 researcher sfewer-r7 demonstrates unauthenticated RCE against a Docker NGINX target (Rapid7 Blog).

Impact

Successful exploitation can crash the NGINX worker process (denial of service), corrupt heap memory, or — on systems with ASLR disabled or bypassable — allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code as the NGINX worker process account (RedHat CVE). Code execution on the NGINX worker can expose proxied application data, private TLS keys cached in worker memory, and backend credentials, and may serve as a pivot point for lateral movement into internal networks. The vulnerability is a data-plane issue only; there is no control-plane exposure (Github Advisory). Given NGINX's ubiquity — powering hundreds of millions of websites — the potential blast radius is extremely large (Wiz Blog).

Exploitability

Multiple public proof-of-concept exploits were released on the same day as disclosure (November 18, 2026). The most significant is a full Python RCE exploit framework by Rapid7 researcher sfewer-r7 (exploit/exploit.py) that claims unauthenticated RCE against a Docker NGINX server (sfewer-r7 PoC). A simpler DoS/crash PoC by LLCForge demonstrates the worker crash via WINDOW_UPDATE flooding without achieving code execution (LLCForge PoC). As of the disclosure date, no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation has been observed, and the EPSS score is 0.0; the CVE is not yet listed in the CISA KEV catalog (Github Advisory). Exploitation is rated not automatable by NVD SSVC due to the high attack complexity (ASLR bypass or disabled ASLR required for RCE), though DoS is straightforward (RedHat CVE).

Exploitation steps

  1. Reconnaissance: Identify internet-facing NGINX instances with HTTP/2 enabled using tools like Shodan (ssl:nginx http2) or Censys. Confirm the target negotiates HTTP/2 via ALPN (h2) over TLS.
  2. Fingerprint the target: Use probe tools (e.g., probe_h2_settings.py from public lab repos) to enumerate the server's HTTP/2 SETTINGS and confirm the NGINX version falls within the vulnerable range (Open Source 1.30.0–1.30.6, 1.31.0–1.31.8; Plus 37.0.0–37.0.8, 37.1.0–37.3.0, R33) (sfewer-r7 PoC).
  3. Trigger the integer underflow (DoS/crash): Open a TLS connection negotiating h2 via ALPN. Send the HTTP/2 client preface, a SETTINGS frame, and a HEADERS frame for a GET request on stream 1. Then flood the connection with WINDOW_UPDATE frames carrying the maximum increment (0x7FFFFFFF) on both stream 1 and the connection (stream 0), driving the flow control window accounting past its allowed threshold and causing an integer underflow (LLCForge PoC).
  4. Confirm worker crash: Poll a health endpoint (e.g., /health) after each connection attempt. A failure to return HTTP 200 indicates the NGINX worker has crashed and restarted.
  5. Escalate to RCE (ASLR-disabled or bypassable targets): Using the Rapid7 exploit framework, build a target-specific memory profile by fingerprinting the local nginx and libc binaries (version, build ID, SHA-256) and supplying operator-derived memory offset deltas (send-chain, resolver-timeout, destroy-pool). Set the GLIBC_TUNABLES environment variable to select the AVX/YMM memcpy path (glibc.cpu.hwcaps=AVX_Fast_Unaligned_Load) to control heap layout. Run the exploit client against a freshly restarted NGINX worker to achieve arbitrary code execution (sfewer-r7 PoC, Rapid7 Blog).

Indicators of compromise

  • Network: Bursts of HTTP/2 WINDOW_UPDATE frames with increment value 0x7FFFFFFF on both stream and connection channels from a single source IP; repeated TLS connections to port 443 (or configured HTTPS port) with h2 ALPN negotiation followed by abrupt disconnection; unusual volume of HTTP/2 SETTINGS frames.
  • Logs: NGINX error logs (/var/log/nginx/error.log) showing repeated worker process crashes: worker process <PID> exited on signal 11 (SIGSEGV); rapid succession of nginx: start worker process entries indicating worker restarts; access log entries showing connections that never complete a response.
  • Process: Unexpected child processes spawned by the NGINX worker (e.g., /bin/sh, bash, curl, wget, python3) on systems where RCE was achieved; NGINX worker processes consuming abnormally high memory before crashing.
  • File System: Unexpected files written to NGINX working directories or /tmp by the nginx worker user; new cron jobs or systemd units created under the nginx service account (post-RCE persistence indicators).
  • System: Core dump files (core.*) generated in the NGINX working directory or /var/crash; dmesg or kernel logs showing segmentation fault entries for the nginx worker process.

Mitigation and workarounds

Patch immediately: Upgrade to NGINX Open Source 1.31.9 or 1.30.7; upgrade NGINX Plus to 37.3.0.1 or 37.0.8.1 (F5 Advisory, Github Advisory). If immediate patching is not possible, disable HTTP/2 in the NGINX configuration by removing http2 from listen directives (e.g., change listen 443 ssl http2; to listen 443 ssl;) — this eliminates the attack surface entirely (RedHat CVE). Additionally, restrict access to NGINX from untrusted networks using firewall rules or WAF policies where feasible. Ensure ASLR is enabled on all Linux hosts running NGINX (sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space=2) to prevent RCE escalation even if the crash is triggered. Monitor NGINX worker processes for unexpected segmentation faults as an indicator of exploitation attempts (Wiz Blog).

Community reactions

The vulnerability generated significant industry attention on its disclosure day (November 18, 2026), with coverage from The Hacker News, CyberScoop, The Register, Forbes, Infosecurity Magazine, and Security Boulevard, among many others. Wiz Research published a detailed technical blog (Wiz Blog), and Rapid7 released both a technical write-up and the sfewer-r7 PoC exploit (Rapid7 Blog). The vulnerability was dubbed nginx2root by the security community, reflecting its potential to escalate from an NGINX worker compromise to host root access when chained with other vulnerabilities. CERT-EU, Canada's CCCS, Ireland's NCSC, and AlmaLinux all issued advisories or blog posts on the same day (CERT-EU). Social media (Mastodon, Bluesky, X/Twitter) saw rapid sharing from security researchers and practitioners, with community consensus emphasizing urgent patching given the public PoC availability and NGINX's massive deployment footprint.

Additional resources

Linux Distribution fix status

Fix availability across major Linux distributions and their releases.

Debian

Fixed

bookworm

nginx: 1.22.1-9+deb12u11

Fixed

sid

nginx: 1.30.6-4

Fixed

trixie

nginx: 1.26.3-3+deb13u11

Fixed

Ubuntu

Fixed

bionic (esm-infra)

nginx: 1.14.0-0ubuntu1.11+esm6

Fixed

devel

nginx: 1.30.6-3ubuntu2

Affected

focal (esm-infra)

nginx: 1.18.0-0ubuntu1.7+esm5

Fixed

jammy

nginx: 1.18.0-6ubuntu14.23

Fixed

noble

nginx: 1.24.0-2ubuntu7.20

Fixed

resolute

nginx: 1.28.3-2ubuntu1.13

Fixed

trusty (esm-infra-legacy)

nginx

Not Affected

xenial (esm-infra-legacy)

nginx: 1.10.3-0ubuntu0.16.04.5+esm11

Fixed

RHEL / CentOS

Fixed

RHEL 9

:appstream:nginx-0:1.20.1-14.el9_2.8.src

Fixed

RHEL 10

nginx-0:1.26.3-1.el10_0.10.src

Fixed

Alpine

Fixed

edge

nginx: 1.30.7-r0

Fixed

v3.21

nginx: 1.26.3-r4

Fixed

v3.22

nginx: 1.28.3-r8

Fixed

v3.23

nginx: 1.28.3-r8

Fixed

Source: This report was generated using AI

Related NGINX vulnerabilities:

CVE ID

Severity

Score

Technologies

Component name

CISA KEV exploit

Has fix

Published date

CVE-2026-123634CRITICAL9.2
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CVE-2026-123633CRITICAL9.2
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CVE-2026-123007CRITICAL9.2
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CVE-2026-125283MEDIUM6.9
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