CVE-2026-24015
Java vulnerability analysis and mitigation

Overview

CVE-2026-24015 is an insecure default configuration vulnerability in Apache IoTDB classified as "Binding to an Unrestricted IP Address" (CWE-1327). It affects Apache IoTDB versions 1.0.0 through 1.3.6 and 2.0.0 through 2.0.6, and was publicly disclosed on March 9, 2026 by reporter Mapta / BugBunny_ai via the Apache security mailing list. The vulnerability carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.8 (Critical), reflecting its network-exploitable, no-privilege, no-interaction nature (OSS-Security, Red Hat CVE).

Technical details

The root cause is CWE-1327 (Binding to an Unrestricted IP Address): Apache IoTDB's default configuration binds its service interfaces to all available network interfaces (e.g., 0.0.0.0) rather than restricting them to localhost or a specific trusted interface. This insecure default exposes the database service directly to any network-reachable host without requiring authentication or user interaction. An attacker on the same network — or on the internet if the host is publicly accessible — can connect to the exposed IoTDB service port and interact with the database directly. No public proof-of-concept exploit code has been identified at this time (OSS-Security, Red Hat CVE).

Impact

Successful exploitation allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to achieve complete compromise of the affected Apache IoTDB instance, with high impact to confidentiality (unauthorized data access), integrity (unauthorized data modification or deletion), and availability (service disruption). Because IoTDB is a time-series database commonly used in industrial IoT and operational technology environments, exploitation could expose sensitive sensor data, operational metrics, or industrial process information. The unrestricted network binding may also facilitate lateral movement within internal networks if the database host has access to other internal systems (OSS-Security, Red Hat CVE).

Exploitation steps

  1. Reconnaissance: Use network scanning tools such as Shodan, Censys, or Nmap to identify internet-facing or network-accessible hosts running Apache IoTDB (default ports include 6667 for the Thrift RPC interface and 8080/9003 for REST/management interfaces).
  2. Confirm exposure: Attempt a direct TCP connection to the IoTDB service port. If the service responds without requiring a VPN or firewall bypass, the instance is bound to an unrestricted IP address and is exploitable.
  3. Connect to the database: Use the IoTDB CLI client or a compatible Thrift/REST client to connect to the exposed service endpoint (e.g., start-cli.sh -h <target_ip> -p 6667).
  4. Authenticate or bypass: On default/misconfigured installations, attempt login with default credentials (e.g., root/root). The unrestricted binding means no network-level control prevents this attempt.
  5. Execute malicious operations: Once connected, perform unauthorized queries to exfiltrate time-series data, modify or delete records, or disrupt service availability by dropping storage groups or overloading the database (OSS-Security).

Indicators of compromise

  • Network: Unexpected inbound TCP connections to IoTDB service ports (default: 6667, 8080, 9003) from external or untrusted IP addresses; outbound connections from the IoTDB host to unknown external IPs following a connection event.
  • Logs: IoTDB access logs showing authentication attempts or successful logins from IP addresses outside expected administrative ranges; repeated connection attempts from a single external IP (brute-force pattern).
  • Process: Unusual query patterns in IoTDB logs such as bulk SELECT operations, DELETE STORAGE GROUP commands, or schema modification queries executed by unexpected client IPs.
  • File System: Unexpected data export files or scripts placed on the IoTDB host filesystem by an external actor following unauthorized access.

Mitigation and workarounds

Apache has released patched versions 1.3.7 (for the 1.x branch) and 2.0.7 (for the 2.x branch) that resolve this issue; upgrading is the recommended remediation (OSS-Security). As an immediate workaround prior to patching, administrators should configure IoTDB to bind only to trusted network interfaces (e.g., localhost or a specific internal IP) by modifying the iotdb-datanode.properties or equivalent configuration file. Additionally, implement network segmentation and firewall rules to restrict access to IoTDB service ports (6667, 8080, 9003) to only authorized hosts and management networks. Change default credentials immediately if they have not already been updated.

Community reactions

The vulnerability was announced on the OSS-Security mailing list on March 9, 2026 by Apache IoTDB contributor Haonan Hou, crediting Mapta / BugBunny_ai as the finder (OSS-Security). The disclosure was also noted on Bluesky by automated CVE tracking accounts shortly after publication. Coverage has been limited to vulnerability aggregator platforms (VulnDB, CVEFeed, INCIBE-CERT), with no significant independent researcher commentary or major media coverage identified at this time.

Additional resources


SourceThis report was generated using AI

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