CVE-2026-25185
vulnerability analysis and mitigation

Overview

CVE-2026-25185 is an information disclosure vulnerability in Windows Shell Link Processing that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to perform spoofing attacks over a network. Disclosed on March 10, 2026, as part of Microsoft's Patch Tuesday, it affects a wide range of Windows versions including Windows 10 (1607, 1809, 21H2, 22H2), Windows 11 (23H2, 24H2, 25H2, 26H1), Windows Server 2012/2012 R2/2016/2019/2022/2022 23H2/2025, and their Server Core variants. The vulnerability carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.3 (Medium) (Microsoft MSRC).

Technical details

The root cause is classified as CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) within the Windows Shell Link (.lnk file) processing subsystem. When Windows processes a specially crafted Shell Link file, it can be coerced into leaking sensitive information — most notably authentication material (e.g., NTLM credentials) — to an attacker-controlled server over the network, enabling spoofing. The attack requires no authentication, no user interaction, and has low complexity, making it exploitable remotely by any network-adjacent or internet-based attacker. A detailed technical write-up and video demonstration titled "LNKMeMaybe" was published by TrustedSec and undercodetesting.com, describing the technique as "silent authentication coercion" (TrustedSec Blog, UndercodeTesting).

Impact

Successful exploitation results in the disclosure of sensitive authentication information (such as NTLM hashes) to an unauthorized attacker, enabling network-based spoofing attacks. While the direct CVSS confidentiality impact is rated Low and there is no integrity or availability impact, the practical consequence is significant: harvested credentials can be relayed or cracked offline to facilitate lateral movement within enterprise networks. Active exploitation has been documented in the wild, with attackers using the coerced authentication material for credential theft and further network compromise (Microsoft MSRC, TrustedSec Blog).

Exploitation steps

  1. Craft a malicious Shell Link file: Create a specially crafted .lnk (Shell Link) file that references a UNC path pointing to an attacker-controlled server (e.g., \\attacker-ip\share\file).
  2. Deliver the payload: Distribute the malicious .lnk file to a target via phishing email, shared network drive, USB, or web download. No user double-click is required — simply browsing to the folder containing the file in Windows Explorer may trigger processing.
  3. Host a capture server: Run a tool such as Responder, Impacket's ntlmrelayx, or a similar SMB/HTTP listener on the attacker-controlled server to capture incoming authentication attempts.
  4. Trigger authentication coercion: When Windows Shell Link processing parses the crafted file, it silently initiates an outbound authentication request to the attacker's server, leaking the victim's NTLM hash without any visible user interaction.
  5. Harvest and relay credentials: Capture the NTLM hash for offline cracking (e.g., using Hashcat) or relay it in real time to authenticate to other internal services, enabling lateral movement (TrustedSec Blog, UndercodeTesting).

Indicators of compromise

  • Network: Unexpected outbound SMB (TCP 445) or WebDAV (TCP 80/443) connections from Windows workstations or servers to external or unknown IP addresses; NTLM authentication attempts to non-corporate servers.
  • File System: Presence of suspicious or unexpected .lnk files in shared directories, user desktops, or recently accessed locations; .lnk files referencing UNC paths to external or unusual hosts.
  • Logs: Windows Security Event Log entries (Event ID 4624/4625) showing NTLM authentication attempts to unfamiliar destinations; SMB session logs showing connections to external IPs initiated by shell processes.
  • Process: explorer.exe or svchost.exe initiating outbound network connections to non-standard destinations coinciding with .lnk file access events.
  • IDS/IPS: Emerging Threats ruleset v11149 (released 2026-03-16) includes signatures for detecting exploitation attempts (Emerging Threats).

Mitigation and workarounds

Microsoft released patches on March 10, 2026 as part of Patch Tuesday; administrators should apply updates immediately. Key patched build numbers include: Windows Server 2022 23H2 → 10.0.25398.2207; Windows 11 23H2 → 10.0.22631.6783; Windows 10 21H2/22H2 → 10.0.19044.7058 / 10.0.19045.7058; Windows 11 24H2 → 10.0.26100.7979; Windows 11 25H2 → 10.0.26200.7979; Windows 11 26H1 → 10.0.28000.1719; Windows Server 2025 → 10.0.26100.32463; Windows Server 2019 → 10.0.17763.8511; Windows Server 2016 → 10.0.14393.8957; Windows Server 2022 → 10.0.20348.4830 (Microsoft MSRC). For systems not yet covered by official patches (e.g., legacy Windows Server 2012/R2), 0patch has released micropatches (0patch Blog). Additional mitigations include blocking outbound SMB/WebDAV to the internet at the network perimeter, enabling SMB signing, restricting NTLM authentication where possible, and monitoring for suspicious .lnk file activity.

Community reactions

TrustedSec published a detailed technical review titled "LNKMeMaybe" shortly after disclosure, which gained significant traction in the security community and was discussed on Reddit's r/blueteamsec (TrustedSec Blog). The vulnerability was covered in multiple Patch Tuesday roundups by Rapid7, Zero Day Initiative, Sophos, Lansweeper, and Cybersecurity News, with analysts noting the no-interaction exploitation requirement as particularly concerning (ZDI Blog, Rapid7 Blog). The Risky Biz newsletter also highlighted the vulnerability, and 0patch's micropatch release for legacy systems drew additional community attention on Reddit and security forums (0patch Blog).

Additional resources


SourceThis report was generated using AI

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