CVE-2026-123611: 
Samba Analyse et atténuation de la vulnérabilité

Aperçu

CVE-2026-123611 is a key exchange downgrade vulnerability in the rustls TLS library (written in Rust) that allows unauthenticated network attackers to poison the per-server-name key-exchange group record via a crafted ServerHello message. Affected versions are all rustls releases before 0.23.46. The vulnerability was published on November 8, 2026, with a patch available in rustls 0.23.46 and 0.24.0-dev.2. It carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 3.7 (Low) and a CVSS v4.0 base score of 6.3 (Medium) (GitHub Advisory, Github Advisory DB).

Détails techniques

The root cause is classified as CWE-757 (Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation / Algorithm Downgrade). The vulnerability arises because rustls records the server-selected key-exchange group per server name when processing a ServerHello message — before the server has been authenticated. A network attacker can intercept or answer one connection attempt for a target server name, respond with a spoofed ServerHello selecting the classical X25519 group, and then close the connection; no certificate or completed handshake is required. Subsequent ClientHellos from the victim client for that server name will include only a classical X25519 key share (while still advertising X25519MLKEM768 as preferred in supported_groups), and if the legitimate server accepts the X25519 share rather than issuing a HelloRetryRequest, the handshake completes with classical key exchange only — silently stripping post-quantum confidentiality protections. TLS 1.3 transcript binding prevents editing an in-flight ClientHello but does not prevent pre-poisoning the client's prediction state from an unauthenticated message (GitHub Advisory).

Impact

The primary impact is loss of post-quantum confidentiality for TLS connections between clients and servers that both support hybrid key exchange (X25519MLKEM768). An attacker who successfully poisons the client's key-exchange prediction store causes future connections to that server name to use only classical X25519 key exchange, making recorded traffic vulnerable to future quantum adversaries via "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks. There is no authentication bypass, no key compromise of active sessions, no integrity impact, and no availability impact; the attack is scoped to the confidentiality of future sessions for the poisoned server name (GitHub Advisory, Github Advisory DB).

Exploitabilité

There is no known public proof-of-concept exploit and no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation as of the time of disclosure (Feedly). The NVD SSVC assessment rates exploitation as "none" and the attack as non-automatable, reflecting the high attack complexity required (the attacker must be positioned to intercept or answer a connection attempt for the target server name). The EPSS score is approximately 0.188% (9th percentile), indicating a low near-term exploitation probability. CVE-2026-123611 is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

Étapes d’exploitation

  1. Positioning: The attacker positions themselves on the network path between the rustls client and the target server, or operates a rogue server/DNS spoofing setup capable of answering connection attempts for the target server name before the legitimate server responds.
  2. Intercept ClientHello: The attacker observes an initial TLS ClientHello from the victim rustls client, which includes both X25519MLKEM768 and X25519 key shares (hybrid mode).
  3. Send malicious ServerHello: The attacker responds with a crafted ServerHello that selects the X25519 key-exchange group (classical only), without completing the handshake or presenting a valid certificate, then closes the connection.
  4. Prediction store poisoned: The rustls client records X25519 as the server-preferred group for that server name in its per-name key-exchange prediction store, since this is written from the unauthenticated ServerHello.
  5. Subsequent connections degraded: On all future connection attempts by the client to that server name (while the poisoned entry persists), the ClientHello carries only a classical X25519 key share. If the legitimate server accepts this share instead of issuing a HelloRetryRequest, the handshake completes with classical key exchange only — silently losing post-quantum confidentiality.
  6. Harvest traffic: The attacker records the classically-encrypted TLS sessions for future decryption once a sufficiently powerful quantum computer becomes available (GitHub Advisory).

Indicateurs de compromis

  • Network: Unexpected TLS ServerHello messages from an IP address that does not match the legitimate server's IP for a given hostname, followed immediately by connection closure without completing the handshake.
  • Network: ClientHello messages from a rustls client that advertise X25519MLKEM768 in supported_groups but include only a classical X25519 key share — indicating a poisoned prediction store.
  • Logs: TLS handshake logs showing repeated connections to a server name that complete with X25519 key exchange despite the client being configured to prefer hybrid post-quantum groups.
  • Logs: Abruptly terminated TLS sessions (RST or FIN immediately after ServerHello) from an unexpected source IP for a known server name, which may indicate the poisoning attempt.

Atténuation et solutions de contournement

Upgrade rustls to version 0.23.46 or later (stable) or 0.24.0-dev.2 or later (development branch), which resolves the vulnerability by not writing the key-exchange group prediction from an unauthenticated ServerHello (GitHub Advisory). As a configuration-based workaround, disabling TLS session resumption (which also disables the key-share prediction store) prevents the vulnerability from being triggered, at the cost of an extra round trip for hybrid key exchange. Servers that always send a HelloRetryRequest when the preferred hybrid group share is absent are also not susceptible to the downgrade completing silently.

Réactions de la communauté

The vulnerability was reported by researcher Adam010341 and published by rustls maintainer ctz via GitHub Security Advisories on October 14, 2026 (GitHub Advisory). The advisory notes that the underlying behavior is discussed in the IETF draft draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction, indicating the security community has been actively debating the risks of client-side key-share prediction in TLS 1.3. Community reaction has been measured given the low CVSS score and absence of active exploitation, with the primary concern centered on long-term post-quantum security posture rather than immediate risk.

Ressources supplémentaires

État de correction de la distribution Linux

Corrigez la disponibilité entre les grandes distributions Linux et leurs versions.

Debian

Fixé

bookworm

rust-rustls

Affecté

sid

rust-rustls: 0.23.46+ds-1

Fixé

trixie

rust-rustls

Affecté

Ubuntu

Inconnu

devel

rust-rustls

Inconnu

noble

rust-rustls

Inconnu

noble (esm-apps)

rust-rustls

Inconnu

resolute

rust-rustls

Inconnu

resolute (esm-apps)

rust-rustls

Inconnu

RHEL / CentOS

Affecté

OpenShift

kata-containers.src

Affecté

RHEL 8

Non affecté

RHEL 9

Non affecté

RHEL 10

Non affecté

Source: Ce rapport a été généré à l’aide de l’IA

Connexe Samba Vulnérabilités :

CVE ID

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Technologies

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A corrigé

Date de publication

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