CVE-2026-123613: 
Samba Analyse et atténuation de la vulnérabilité

Aperçu

CVE-2026-123613 is a TLS 1.3 handshake encryption level bypass vulnerability in the Rustls library, classified as a security feature bypass (CWE-20: Improper Input Validation). Rustls versions 0.23.13 through 0.23.44 (inclusive) incorrectly accept TLS 1.3 handshake messages at the wrong encryption level when they follow a key-changing message in the same record, because Deframer::aligned does not enforce RFC 8446 record-boundary alignment. This allows a peer or on-path attacker to pack a plaintext EncryptedExtensions message with the ServerHello, which rustls accepts unencrypted. The vulnerability was published on November 8, 2026, and carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.3 (Medium) and a CVSS v4.0 base score of 6.9 (Medium) (Github Advisory, Rustls Advisory).

Détails techniques

The root cause is improper input validation (CWE-20) in the Deframer::aligned function, which considers itself aligned as long as all messages remaining in the buffer are complete, without enforcing that handshake messages do not span key changes at record boundaries as required by RFC 8446 Section 5.1. During a TLS 1.3 handshake, rustls processes the ServerHello and installs handshake keys, then pulls a complete but plaintext EncryptedExtensions message from the same record buffer without verifying it was received at the correct encryption level. RFC 8446 mandates that implementations MUST terminate the connection with an unexpected_message alert if messages immediately preceding a key change do not align with a record boundary; rustls fails to enforce this check. The vulnerability is similar to Go's CVE-2025-61730, and other TLS implementations (Botan, OpenSSL, BoringSSL, Go, wolfSSL) correctly reject this protocol flow. The fix is tracked in commit 5046bdf (Rustls Advisory, Github Advisory).

Impact

Successful exploitation allows an on-path or peer attacker to inject plaintext handshake messages (specifically EncryptedExtensions) that rustls accepts without proper encryption verification, potentially enabling the attacker to influence or observe TLS handshake parameters such as negotiated extensions. Importantly, the handshake transcript remains authenticated, meaning a network-position attacker cannot use this flaw to alter or complete a handshake undetected; the practical effect is limited to a peer sending messages that should be encrypted in plaintext without rustls rejecting the connection. There is no availability or integrity impact; the confidentiality impact is rated low, as an attacker may observe or influence handshake extension data (Rustls Advisory, Github Advisory).

Exploitabilité

There is no known public proof-of-concept exploit and no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation at this time (Github Advisory). The vulnerability was discovered using a new TLS/DTLS test suite inspired by the analogous Go CVE-2025-61730. The EPSS score is approximately 0.156% (5th percentile), indicating a low near-term exploitation probability. The vulnerability is automatable (no user interaction or privileges required) but requires a network on-path or peer position. It is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog (Github Advisory).

Étapes d’exploitation

  1. Positioning: Attain a network on-path (man-in-the-middle) or peer position between a rustls client and a TLS server, targeting a rustls version between 0.23.13 and 0.23.44.
  2. Craft malicious TLS record: Construct a TLS record that packs a plaintext EncryptedExtensions message immediately following the ServerHello message within the same TLS record, violating RFC 8446 record-boundary alignment requirements.
  3. Deliver the record: Send the crafted TLS record to the rustls client during the TLS 1.3 handshake, at the point where the client expects to receive the ServerHello.
  4. Bypass encryption check: Rustls processes the ServerHello, installs handshake keys, then reads the EncryptedExtensions from the same buffer without verifying it was received at the correct encryption level — accepting the plaintext message as valid.
  5. Influence handshake parameters: The attacker can use this to inject or observe EncryptedExtensions content (e.g., negotiated extensions) without the connection being terminated, though the handshake transcript authentication prevents full handshake takeover (Rustls Advisory).

Indicateurs de compromis

  • Network: Anomalous TLS records during handshake where a single TLS record contains both a ServerHello and an EncryptedExtensions message; unexpected plaintext handshake messages observed in TLS traffic captures.
  • Logs: TLS connection logs showing successful handshakes with rustls versions 0.23.13–0.23.44 where EncryptedExtensions were not received in a separate encrypted record; absence of unexpected_message alerts that compliant implementations would generate for this protocol flow.
  • Application Behavior: Rustls-based applications accepting TLS connections from peers that violate RFC 8446 record-boundary alignment without terminating the connection.

Atténuation et solutions de contournement

The primary remediation is to upgrade Rustls to version 0.23.45 or later, which enforces proper RFC 8446 record-boundary alignment in Deframer::aligned. All applications using Rustls versions 0.23.13 through 0.23.44 should be patched immediately. No configuration-based workaround is available; upgrading is the only effective mitigation. Administrators should also review TLS connection logs for anomalies during the vulnerability window (Rustls Advisory, Github Advisory).

Réactions de la communauté

The vulnerability was discovered using a new TLS/DTLS test suite under construction, with the specific test case inspired by Go's CVE-2025-61730. The rustls maintainer (ctz) published the advisory and credited randombit as the reporter, and noted that Daybreak Blue reviewed the rustls code to identify the probable root cause. The advisory notes that all other major TLS implementations tested (Botan, OpenSSL, BoringSSL, Go, wolfSSL) correctly reject the malformed protocol flow, highlighting rustls as an outlier. Community discussion was noted on Mastodon/infosec.exchange and aggregated by security feeds shortly after disclosure (Rustls Advisory).

Ressources supplémentaires

État de correction de la distribution Linux

Corrigez la disponibilité entre les grandes distributions Linux et leurs versions.

Debian

Fixé

bookworm

rust-rustls

Affecté

sid

rust-rustls: 0.23.45+ds-1

Fixé

trixie

rust-rustls

Affecté

Ubuntu

Inconnu

devel

rust-rustls

Inconnu

noble

rust-rustls

Inconnu

noble (esm-apps)

rust-rustls

Inconnu

resolute

rust-rustls

Inconnu

resolute (esm-apps)

rust-rustls

Inconnu

RHEL / CentOS

Affecté

OpenShift

kata-containers.src

Affecté

RHEL 8

Non affecté

RHEL 9

Non affecté

RHEL 10

Non affecté

Source: Ce rapport a été généré à l’aide de l’IA

Connexe Samba Vulnérabilités :

CVE ID

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Technologies

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Exploit CISA KEV

A corrigé

Date de publication

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