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CVE-2026-123613 is a TLS 1.3 handshake encryption level bypass vulnerability in the Rustls library, classified as a security feature bypass (CWE-20: Improper Input Validation). Rustls versions 0.23.13 through 0.23.44 (inclusive) incorrectly accept TLS 1.3 handshake messages at the wrong encryption level when they follow a key-changing message in the same record, because Deframer::aligned does not enforce RFC 8446 record-boundary alignment. This allows a peer or on-path attacker to pack a plaintext EncryptedExtensions message with the ServerHello, which rustls accepts unencrypted. The vulnerability was published on November 8, 2026, and carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.3 (Medium) and a CVSS v4.0 base score of 6.9 (Medium) (Github Advisory, Rustls Advisory).
The root cause is improper input validation (CWE-20) in the Deframer::aligned function, which considers itself aligned as long as all messages remaining in the buffer are complete, without enforcing that handshake messages do not span key changes at record boundaries as required by RFC 8446 Section 5.1. During a TLS 1.3 handshake, rustls processes the ServerHello and installs handshake keys, then pulls a complete but plaintext EncryptedExtensions message from the same record buffer without verifying it was received at the correct encryption level. RFC 8446 mandates that implementations MUST terminate the connection with an unexpected_message alert if messages immediately preceding a key change do not align with a record boundary; rustls fails to enforce this check. The vulnerability is similar to Go's CVE-2025-61730, and other TLS implementations (Botan, OpenSSL, BoringSSL, Go, wolfSSL) correctly reject this protocol flow. The fix is tracked in commit 5046bdf (Rustls Advisory, Github Advisory).
Successful exploitation allows an on-path or peer attacker to inject plaintext handshake messages (specifically EncryptedExtensions) that rustls accepts without proper encryption verification, potentially enabling the attacker to influence or observe TLS handshake parameters such as negotiated extensions. Importantly, the handshake transcript remains authenticated, meaning a network-position attacker cannot use this flaw to alter or complete a handshake undetected; the practical effect is limited to a peer sending messages that should be encrypted in plaintext without rustls rejecting the connection. There is no availability or integrity impact; the confidentiality impact is rated low, as an attacker may observe or influence handshake extension data (Rustls Advisory, Github Advisory).
There is no known public proof-of-concept exploit and no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation at this time (Github Advisory). The vulnerability was discovered using a new TLS/DTLS test suite inspired by the analogous Go CVE-2025-61730. The EPSS score is approximately 0.156% (5th percentile), indicating a low near-term exploitation probability. The vulnerability is automatable (no user interaction or privileges required) but requires a network on-path or peer position. It is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog (Github Advisory).
EncryptedExtensions message immediately following the ServerHello message within the same TLS record, violating RFC 8446 record-boundary alignment requirements.ServerHello.ServerHello, installs handshake keys, then reads the EncryptedExtensions from the same buffer without verifying it was received at the correct encryption level — accepting the plaintext message as valid.EncryptedExtensions content (e.g., negotiated extensions) without the connection being terminated, though the handshake transcript authentication prevents full handshake takeover (Rustls Advisory).ServerHello and an EncryptedExtensions message; unexpected plaintext handshake messages observed in TLS traffic captures.EncryptedExtensions were not received in a separate encrypted record; absence of unexpected_message alerts that compliant implementations would generate for this protocol flow.The primary remediation is to upgrade Rustls to version 0.23.45 or later, which enforces proper RFC 8446 record-boundary alignment in Deframer::aligned. All applications using Rustls versions 0.23.13 through 0.23.44 should be patched immediately. No configuration-based workaround is available; upgrading is the only effective mitigation. Administrators should also review TLS connection logs for anomalies during the vulnerability window (Rustls Advisory, Github Advisory).
The vulnerability was discovered using a new TLS/DTLS test suite under construction, with the specific test case inspired by Go's CVE-2025-61730. The rustls maintainer (ctz) published the advisory and credited randombit as the reporter, and noted that Daybreak Blue reviewed the rustls code to identify the probable root cause. The advisory notes that all other major TLS implementations tested (Botan, OpenSSL, BoringSSL, Go, wolfSSL) correctly reject the malformed protocol flow, highlighting rustls as an outlier. Community discussion was noted on Mastodon/infosec.exchange and aggregated by security feeds shortly after disclosure (Rustls Advisory).
Corrigez la disponibilité entre les grandes distributions Linux et leurs versions.
devel
rust-rustls
noble
rust-rustls
noble (esm-apps)
rust-rustls
resolute
rust-rustls
resolute (esm-apps)
rust-rustls
Source: Ce rapport a été généré à l’aide de l’IA
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