New from Wiz Research: Critical NGINX flaw. Understand the risk and impact.
Vulnerability DatabaseCVE-2026-125332

CVE-2026-125332: 
NixOS vulnerability analysis and mitigation

Overview

CVE-2026-125332 is a denial-of-service vulnerability in node-forge (also called Forge), a native JavaScript implementation of Transport Layer Security. A forge.tls client fails to validate the compression_method field in a TLS ServerHello message, accepting values it never offered in its ClientHello. This allows a malicious server or on-path attacker to send an unsupported compression method, causing tls.createConnectionState() to throw an uncaught Error that terminates the Node.js process if the application does not catch the exception. All versions prior to 1.4.3 of the node-forge npm package are affected; forge.tls servers are not impacted. The vulnerability carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.9 (Medium) (Github Advisory, Forge Advisory).

Technical details

The root cause is a combination of improper input validation (CWE-20) and an uncaught exception (CWE-248) in lib/tls.js. The function tls.parseHelloMessage() stores the ServerHello's compression_method byte without validating it against the methods offered in the ClientHello — the code even contains a TODO: handle compression methods comment at the vulnerable location. When the client subsequently processes ServerHelloDone, it calls tls.createConnectionState(), which throws Error('Unsupported compression algorithm.') for any method other than null (0) or deflate (1). Because the ServerHello is unauthenticated at this point (authentication occurs only at the server's Finished message), an on-path attacker can modify the compression byte of a legitimate ServerHello without invalidating the certificate chain. The fix in version 1.4.3 adds an explicit check in tls.parseHelloMessage() that fails the handshake with an illegal_parameter alert via the connection's error callback instead of throwing an uncaught exception (Forge Advisory, Patch Commit).

Impact

Successful exploitation results in a denial-of-service condition: the targeted Node.js process terminates, dropping all active connections it was handling. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact — the attacker cannot read data or modify application state. Affected client paths include direct forge.tls usage, forge.tls.wrapSocket, and forge.http; applications that wrap connection.process() in a try-catch block are not affected. The scope is limited to the vulnerable client process and does not enable lateral movement or data exfiltration (Github Advisory).

Exploitability

A proof-of-concept is publicly available in the official security advisory and is included in the repository's test suite at tests/pocs/GHSA-w4xr-hqv8-ch44.js. The PoC demonstrates that sending a ServerHello with compression_method 0xff, followed by a valid Certificate and ServerHelloDone, triggers the crash on versions ≤ 1.4.2. There is no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation at this time, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. The EPSS score is approximately 0.43–0.46%, indicating a low probability of exploitation in the near term. Exploitation requires the attacker to be either the connected server or positioned on-path to intercept and modify the unauthenticated ServerHello, which raises the attack complexity (Github Advisory, Feedly).

Exploitation steps

  1. Identify target: Locate a Node.js application using node-forge ≤ 1.4.2 as a TLS client via forge.tls, forge.tls.wrapSocket, or forge.http, where connection.process() is called without exception handling.
  2. Position for attack: Either operate a malicious server that the target client connects to, or position on-path (e.g., via ARP spoofing, DNS hijacking, or a rogue Wi-Fi access point) to intercept and modify TLS handshake traffic before the server's Finished message.
  3. Craft malicious ServerHello: Construct a TLS ServerHello record with the compression_method byte set to an unsupported value (e.g., 0xff). If acting as an on-path attacker, intercept the legitimate ServerHello and replace the compression byte.
  4. Send crafted handshake sequence: Deliver the malicious ServerHello followed by a valid Certificate and a ServerHelloDone message to the client: client.process(serverHello + certificate + serverHelloDone);
  5. Trigger crash: The client's tls.createConnectionState() throws Error('Unsupported compression algorithm.') during ServerHelloDone processing. If the application does not catch this exception, the Node.js process terminates, dropping all connections (Forge Advisory, Patch Commit).

Indicators of compromise

  • Logs: Unhandled Node.js exception logs containing Error: Unsupported compression algorithm. originating from tls.js or connection.process() in the application stack trace.
  • Process: Unexpected termination of a Node.js process that was handling TLS connections via node-forge, particularly if it drops all active connections simultaneously.
  • Network: TLS ServerHello messages observed in network captures with a compression_method byte value other than 0x00 (null) or 0x01 (deflate), especially 0xff; these are anomalous per RFC 5246 since standard servers always select null compression.
  • Network: Unexpected TCP RST or connection drops from a Node.js service immediately following a TLS handshake initiation, without a proper TLS alert being sent by the client (Forge Advisory).

Mitigation and workarounds

The primary remediation is to upgrade node-forge to version 1.4.3 or later, which adds an explicit validation check in tls.parseHelloMessage() that fails the handshake with an illegal_parameter alert instead of throwing an uncaught exception. As a temporary workaround for applications that cannot immediately upgrade, wrap all calls to connection.process() in a try-catch block and close the socket on exception. Note that forge.tls.wrapSocket and forge.http call process() internally, so applications using these APIs must also apply the workaround at the appropriate level (Github Advisory, Release v1.4.3).

Community reactions

The vulnerability was reported by security researcher @alienkeric and disclosed by maintainer @davidlehn as part of the node-forge 1.4.3 release, which bundled fixes for five security issues simultaneously. The advisory notes a related prior vulnerability (GHSA-525v-9gp9-w22h) that caused a similar TLS client crash during the handshake, fixed in version 1.4.1, suggesting a pattern of incomplete TLS handshake validation in the library. Red Hat and Microsoft both tracked the CVE through their respective advisory systems, indicating broad ecosystem awareness (Forge Advisory, Release PR).

Additional resources

Linux Distribution fix status

Fix availability across major Linux distributions and their releases.

Ubuntu

Unknown

focal (esm-apps)

node-node-forge

Unknown

jammy

node-node-forge

Unknown

jammy (esm-apps)

node-node-forge

Unknown

RHEL / CentOS

Affected

RHEL 8

pcs.src

Affected

RHEL 9

pcs.src

Affected

RHEL 10

pcs.src

Affected

Source: This report was generated using AI

Related NixOS vulnerabilities:

CVE ID

Severity

Score

Technologies

Component name

CISA KEV exploit

Has fix

Published date

CVE-2026-125336HIGH7.4
  • Grafana logoGrafana
  • grafana-prometheus
NoYesNov 10, 2026
CVE-2026-125334MEDIUM5.9
  • Grafana logoGrafana
  • jitsucom-jitsu
NoYesNov 10, 2026
CVE-2026-125333MEDIUM5.9
  • NixOS logoNixOS
  • wazuh-dashboard-fips
NoYesNov 10, 2026
CVE-2026-125332MEDIUM5.9
  • NixOS logoNixOS
  • gitlab-rails-ce-19.5
NoYesNov 10, 2026
CVE-2026-125335LOW3.7
  • NixOS logoNixOS
  • dotstatsuite-supercore
NoYesNov 10, 2026

Free Vulnerability Assessment

Benchmark your Cloud Security Posture

Evaluate your cloud security practices across 9 security domains to benchmark your risk level and identify gaps in your defenses.

Request assessment

Additional Wiz resources

Get a personalized demo

Ready to see Wiz in action?

"Best User Experience I have ever seen, provides full visibility to cloud workloads."
David EstlickCISO
"Wiz provides a single pane of glass to see what is going on in our cloud environments."
Adam FletcherChief Security Officer
"We know that if Wiz identifies something as critical, it actually is."
Greg PoniatowskiHead of Threat and Vulnerability Management