Vulnerability DatabaseCVE-2026-130335

CVE-2026-130335: 
Linux Debian vulnerability analysis and mitigation

Overview

CVE-2026-130335 is an OS command injection vulnerability in Info-ZIP Zip 3.0 and 3.1 beta through 3.1c that allows an attacker who controls the command line to execute arbitrary shell commands. The vulnerability is triggered when a victim uses the -T option with a filename containing shell metacharacters on a platform (such as Linux) where a suitable shell is invoked. Affected versions span from 2.2 through 3.0 (and 3.1 beta through 3.1c), while versions 3.1a through 3.1c are listed as unaffected by NVD. It was published on November 17, 2026, with a CVSS v3.1 base score of 2.9 (Low) (Github Advisory).

Technical details

The root cause is improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command (CWE-78): the check_zipfile() function in zip.c constructs a shell command string using the C standard library system() function, passing the archive filename without sanitization. When the -T option is used, the filename is wrapped in single quotes on Unix platforms, but an attacker-controlled filename containing a single-quote breakout (e.g., a.zip';id>marker;#) can terminate the quoted argument and inject arbitrary shell commands. Apple's macOS patch (zip-11.1) demonstrates the fix by replacing system() calls with posix_spawnp(), which avoids shell interpretation entirely (Apple OSD). A public PoC exploit (Python) is available on GitHub that demonstrates the injection via a crafted filename submitted to a network-facing packaging service (PoC GitHub).

Impact

Successful exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the user or process running the zip command. The integrity impact is low (limited to what the zip worker process can modify), with no direct confidentiality or availability impact per the CVSS scoring. However, in scenarios where zip -T is invoked by a privileged service or daemon with attacker-controlled filenames — such as a network-facing file packaging API — the impact could escalate to full system compromise, as demonstrated by the PoC achieving uid=0(root) command execution in a lab environment (Github Advisory, PoC GitHub).

Exploitability

A public proof-of-concept exploit (Python) is available on GitHub, demonstrating single-quote breakout injection against a lab packaging service that passes attacker-controlled filenames to zip -T. The PoC achieves command execution as root in the lab environment. As of the disclosure date, there is no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation, no threat actor attribution, and the CVE is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog. The EPSS score is 0.0, reflecting the low likelihood of widespread exploitation given the narrow preconditions required (PoC GitHub, Github Advisory).

Exploitation steps

  1. Reconnaissance: Identify a target service that accepts user-controlled filenames and internally invokes zip -T on a Linux/Unix system running a vulnerable Info-ZIP Zip version (2.2–3.0 or 3.1 beta–3.1c). This could be a web-based file packaging API.
  2. Fingerprint the service: Send a GET /info request to the target service to retrieve version information and confirm the service is running a vulnerable zip build.
  3. Establish a benign baseline: Submit a POST /pack request with a normal filename (e.g., release-1.0.zip) to observe expected zip_exit and stderr behavior.
  4. Inject shell metacharacters: Submit a POST /pack request with a crafted filename such as a.zip';id>ziplab-pwned;# — the single quote closes the quoted argument, id>ziplab-pwned executes and redirects output to a marker file, and # comments out the remainder of the command.
  5. Verify execution: Check the service response for marker_exists and marker_content fields, or retrieve the marker file, to confirm that the injected command executed (e.g., output showing uid=0(root)).
  6. Escalate: Replace the id command with a reverse shell, data exfiltration command, or persistence mechanism to achieve the attacker's objective (PoC GitHub).

Indicators of compromise

  • Network: Unexpected HTTP POST requests to packaging or archiving service endpoints with filenames containing shell metacharacters (single quotes, semicolons, backticks, $, >, #); outbound connections from the zip worker process to unknown external IPs.
  • File System: Unexpected marker or output files (e.g., ziplab-pwned) created in the working directory of the zip process; new files written by the zip service user account in unusual locations; web shells or scripts dropped by the zip worker.
  • Logs: Application or web server logs showing POST requests with filenames containing ', ;, `, $, or > characters; zip process stderr logs showing unexpected command output or errors unrelated to archive testing.
  • Process: Unusual child processes spawned by the zip process (e.g., /bin/sh, id, curl, wget, bash) visible in process trees; processes running as the zip service user performing unexpected system calls (PoC GitHub).

Mitigation and workarounds

Update Info-ZIP Zip to a version beyond 3.1c that addresses this vulnerability; the Debian security announcement and GitHub advisory confirm a patch is available. As a workaround, avoid passing user-controlled or untrusted filenames to zip -T invocations, and implement strict input validation to reject filenames containing shell metacharacters (', ;, `, $, >, |, &). Where possible, replace system() calls with posix_spawnp() (as Apple's patch demonstrates) to avoid shell interpretation entirely. Restrict the zip process to run with minimal required privileges, and consider disabling the -T option in automated or service contexts (Github Advisory, Apple OSD, Debian Bug).

Community reactions

The vulnerability was noted on Mastodon's infosec.exchange CVE feed shortly after disclosure. The CVE description itself includes a notable qualifier: "NOTE: there is no known common scenario in which an untrusted filename reaches a zip -T call," which has tempered community concern. Debian issued a security announcement (DSA msg00350) and tracked the issue via its bug tracker. Overall community sentiment reflects low urgency given the narrow exploitation preconditions and low CVSS score, though the availability of a PoC has drawn some attention from security researchers (Github Advisory, Debian Bug).

Additional resources

Linux Distribution fix status

Fix availability across major Linux distributions and their releases.

Debian

Fixed

bookworm

zip: 3.0-13+deb12u1

Fixed

sid

zip: 3.0-16

Fixed

trixie

zip: 3.0-15+deb13u1

Fixed

Ubuntu

Unknown

bionic (esm-infra)

zip

Unknown

devel

zip

Unknown

focal (esm-infra)

zip

Unknown

jammy

zip

Unknown

noble

zip

Unknown

resolute

zip

Unknown

trusty (esm-infra-legacy)

zip

Unknown

xenial (esm-infra-legacy)

zip

Unknown

Source: This report was generated using AI

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