CVE-2026-25588
Redis vulnerability analysis and mitigation

Overview

CVE-2026-25588 is a heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the RedisTimeSeries module for Redis, affecting all versions before 1.12.14. The flaw exists in the module's handling of serialized values processed through the Redis RESTORE command, where insufficient input validation can trigger invalid memory access and potentially lead to remote code execution. It was published on May 5, 2026, and patched in version 1.12.14 released the same day. The vulnerability carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.8 (High) and a CVSS v4.0 base score of 7.7 (High) (GitHub Advisory, Red Hat). It was discovered by a group of researchers known as "Skateboarding Dog" during the Wiz Zeroday Cloud event (GitHub Advisory).

Technical details

The root cause is classified as CWE-122 (Heap-based Buffer Overflow) and CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation). The RedisTimeSeries module fails to properly validate serialized data when processing the Redis RESTORE command, allowing a crafted serialized payload to trigger unsafe memory accesses in the heap (GitHub Advisory). Exploitation requires the attacker to be authenticated to the Redis instance, have the RedisTimeSeries module loaded on the server, and possess permission to execute the RESTORE command. The attack vector is network-based with low privileges required and no user interaction needed (GitHub Advisory, Red Hat).

Impact

Successful exploitation allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the Redis server process, potentially resulting in full system compromise, data exfiltration, unauthorized data modification, or service disruption. The vulnerability has high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected Redis instance (GitHub Advisory). Given that Redis servers often store sensitive application data and may be accessible from multiple internal services, a successful compromise could facilitate lateral movement within an environment (Redis Blog).

Exploitation steps

  1. Reconnaissance: Identify Redis servers with the RedisTimeSeries module loaded, using network scanning tools (e.g., Shodan, Censys, or nmap targeting port 6379) and probing with MODULE LIST after authentication.
  2. Authentication: Obtain valid Redis credentials through credential stuffing, leaked secrets, or misconfigured instances with no authentication (requirepass not set).
  3. Verify RESTORE permissions: Confirm the authenticated user has permission to execute the RESTORE command by checking ACL rules (ACL WHOAMI, ACL LIST).
  4. Craft malicious payload: Construct a specially crafted serialized payload that exploits the insufficient validation in the RedisTimeSeries module's deserialization logic, designed to trigger a heap-based buffer overflow.
  5. Execute RESTORE command: Send the malicious payload via the Redis RESTORE command (e.g., RESTORE <key> 0 <crafted_serialized_payload>) to the target server.
  6. Achieve code execution: The malformed payload triggers invalid memory access in the heap, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution in the context of the Redis server process (GitHub Advisory).

Indicators of compromise

  • Network: Unexpected or anomalous connections to Redis port (default 6379/tcp) from unusual source IPs; large or malformed RESTORE command payloads observed in network traffic captures.
  • Logs: Redis server logs showing RESTORE command executions from unexpected or low-privilege users; crash logs or core dumps generated by the Redis process indicating memory access violations.
  • Process: Unexpected child processes spawned by the Redis server process (e.g., shells, network utilities); Redis process consuming abnormal CPU or memory resources.
  • File System: Unexpected files written to the Redis working directory or system temp directories; new cron jobs, SSH keys, or persistence mechanisms created under the Redis service account.

Mitigation and workarounds

Upgrade RedisTimeSeries to version 1.12.14 or later, which contains the security fix for this vulnerability (GitHub Release). Note that starting with Redis 8, the time series data structure is integral to Redis and does not require a separate module installation. As a temporary workaround, restrict access to the RESTORE command using Redis ACL rules to limit which authenticated users can execute it (e.g., ACL SETUSER <username> -RESTORE) (GitHub Advisory). Additionally, enforce network-level controls to restrict Redis access to trusted hosts only, and ensure Redis is not exposed to the public internet.

Community reactions

Redis published an official security advisory blog post covering CVE-2026-25588 alongside four other CVEs disclosed in the same batch (Redis Blog). The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) issued an alert (AV26-423) covering the Redis security advisories (CCCS Advisory). Security news outlets including GBHackers, CyberSecurityNews, and CyberPress covered the Redis vulnerability batch, highlighting the RCE risk to exposed Redis servers (GBHackers, CyberSecurityNews). The Hong Kong CERT also issued a security bulletin covering multiple Redis vulnerabilities in the same disclosure (HKCERT).

Additional resources


SourceThis report was generated using AI

Related Redis vulnerabilities:

CVE ID

Severity

Score

Technologies

Component name

CISA KEV exploit

Has fix

Published date

CVE-2026-25589HIGH7.7
  • Redis logoRedis
  • cpe:2.3:a:redis:redis
NoYesMay 05, 2026
CVE-2026-25588HIGH7.7
  • Redis logoRedis
  • redis-8.4
NoYesMay 05, 2026
CVE-2026-25243HIGH7.7
  • Redis logoRedis
  • redis-8.2
NoYesMay 05, 2026
CVE-2026-23479HIGH7.7
  • Redis logoRedis
  • redis
NoYesMay 05, 2026
CVE-2026-23631MEDIUM6.1
  • Redis logoRedis
  • redis-doc
NoYesMay 05, 2026

Free Vulnerability Assessment

Benchmark your Cloud Security Posture

Evaluate your cloud security practices across 9 security domains to benchmark your risk level and identify gaps in your defenses.

Request assessment

Get a personalized demo

Ready to see Wiz in action?

"Best User Experience I have ever seen, provides full visibility to cloud workloads."
David EstlickCISO
"Wiz provides a single pane of glass to see what is going on in our cloud environments."
Adam FletcherChief Security Officer
"We know that if Wiz identifies something as critical, it actually is."
Greg PoniatowskiHead of Threat and Vulnerability Management