CVE-2026-40164: 
Rocky Linux vulnerability analysis and mitigation

Overview

CVE-2026-40164 is an algorithmic complexity denial-of-service vulnerability in jq, the widely-used command-line JSON processor. It affects all versions of jq up to and including 1.8.1, stemming from the use of MurmurHash3 with a hardcoded, publicly visible seed (0x432A9843) for all JSON object hash table operations. Disclosed on April 13–14, 2026, the vulnerability was reported by AsafMeizner and patched in commit 0c7d133c3c7e37c00b6d46b658a02244fdd3c784. It carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (High) (GitHub Advisory, Red Hat Bugzilla).

Technical details

The root cause is the use of a compile-time constant hash seed (0x432A9843) in src/jv.c (line 1200) for MurmurHash3, which is used for all JSON object hash table operations (CWE-328: Use of Weak Hash; CWE-407: Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity; CWE-341: Predictable from Observable State). Because the seed is hardcoded and publicly visible in the source code, an attacker can precompute hash collisions offline and craft a JSON object where all keys map to the same hash bucket. This degrades hash table lookups from O(1) to O(n), turning any jq expression into an O(n²) operation. The attack requires no authentication or special privileges — only the ability to supply crafted JSON input (~100 KB) to a jq-processing pipeline. A proof-of-concept Python script was published in the GitHub Security Advisory that generates a collision-inducing payload; benchmarks show 10,000 colliding keys (~200 KB) cause processing times of approximately 100 seconds (GitHub Advisory, GitHub Commit).

Impact

Successful exploitation causes significant CPU exhaustion and denial of service on any system processing attacker-controlled JSON with jq. The attack is particularly impactful in CI/CD pipelines (e.g., curl | jq patterns), web services that parse JSON responses using jq, and automated data processing scripts. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact — the vulnerability is purely an availability issue — but sustained exploitation can render affected services unresponsive with a payload as small as ~100 KB, far more practical than heap overflow attacks requiring ~1.43 GB (GitHub Advisory).

Exploitability

A proof-of-concept Python script is publicly available in the GitHub Security Advisory, demonstrating offline precomputation of colliding keys and generation of a malicious JSON payload. No in-the-wild exploitation has been confirmed, and the vulnerability is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. The EPSS score is approximately 0.036%, reflecting low current exploitation probability. The attack requires no authentication, no user interaction, and is network-accessible, making it straightforward to weaponize against exposed jq-processing endpoints (GitHub Advisory, Feedly).

Exploitation steps

  1. Reconnaissance: Identify services or pipelines that process attacker-controlled JSON input using jq (e.g., web APIs that pipe responses through curl | jq, CI/CD scripts, or data processing workflows).
  2. Precompute collisions offline: Using the known hardcoded seed 0x432A9843, run the published PoC Python script to enumerate keys that all hash to the same MurmurHash3 bucket. The script iterates candidate strings and checks if murmur3_32(key) == target_hash.
  3. Generate malicious payload: Construct a JSON object with thousands of collision-inducing keys (e.g., 10,000 keys in ~200 KB). The PoC script outputs this directly as valid JSON: python3 generate.py > payload.json.
  4. Deliver the payload: Submit the crafted JSON to the target system — via HTTP POST body, API parameter, file upload, or any other input channel that feeds into jq processing.
  5. Trigger DoS: When jq processes the payload, hash table lookups degrade from O(1) to O(n), causing O(n²) overall complexity. With 10,000 colliding keys, processing takes ~100 seconds instead of milliseconds, exhausting CPU and causing denial of service (GitHub Advisory).

Indicators of compromise

  • Network: Unusually large JSON payloads (~100 KB–2 MB) submitted to endpoints that process JSON with jq; repeated requests with structurally similar JSON objects containing many keys.
  • Process: Abnormally high and sustained CPU utilization by the jq process or parent processes (e.g., shell scripts, web server workers) that invoke jq; jq processes running for minutes or hours instead of milliseconds.
  • Logs: Application or web server logs showing requests with large JSON bodies followed by timeouts or slow response times; CI/CD pipeline logs showing jq steps hanging or exceeding time limits.
  • File System: Presence of files named payload.json or similar containing JSON objects with thousands of keys that all share the same hash value (detectable by inspecting key patterns such as x0000000, x0000001, etc.).

Mitigation and workarounds

The fix is available in commit 0c7d133c3c7e37c00b6d46b658a02244fdd3c784, which replaces the hardcoded seed with a randomly initialized seed using arc4random(), getentropy(), or /dev/urandom at process startup via pthread_once. Organizations should upgrade jq to a version containing this commit. Downstream distributions have released patches: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 (RHSA-2026:16252), RHEL 9 (RHSA-2026:16693), RHEL 10 (RHSA-2026:16692), Ubuntu (USN-8202-1, USN-8202-2, USN-8202-3), Amazon Linux 2023 (ALAS2023-2026-1815), and others. As a workaround where patching is not immediately possible, restrict or validate JSON input size and structure before passing to jq, and avoid exposing jq-processing pipelines to untrusted input (GitHub Commit, Red Hat Bugzilla).

Community reactions

The vulnerability was discussed on the oss-security mailing list shortly after disclosure (oss-sec). Security community commentary noted that the fix mirrors hash randomization approaches adopted by Python (3.3+), Ruby (1.9+), and Perl (5.18+) years ago, highlighting jq's lag in adopting this well-established defense. The advisory was picked up by multiple Linux security news outlets and scanner vendors (Tenable Nessus, Qualys), reflecting broad awareness. No significant vendor controversy or disputed findings were noted.

Additional resources

Linux Distribution fix status

Fix availability across major Linux distributions and their releases.

Debian

Fixed

bookworm

jq: 1.6-2.1+deb12u2

Fixed

sid

jq: 1.8.1-5

Fixed

trixie

jq: 1.7.1-6+deb13u2

Fixed

Ubuntu

Fixed

bionic (esm-apps)

jq: 1.5+dfsg-2ubuntu0.1~esm3

Fixed

devel

jq

Not Affected

focal (esm-infra)

jq: 1.6-1ubuntu0.20.04.1+esm2

Fixed

jammy

jq: 1.6-2.1ubuntu3.2

Fixed

noble

jq: 1.7.1-3ubuntu0.24.04.2

Fixed

questing

jq: 1.8.1-3ubuntu1.1

Fixed

resolute

jq: 1.8.1-4ubuntu2

Fixed

xenial (esm-apps-legacy)

jq: 1.5+dfsg-1ubuntu0.1+esm4

Fixed

RHEL / CentOS

Fixed

OpenShift

el8:openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8-0:412.86.202606140301-0

Fixed

RHEL 8

:appstream:jq/jq-0:1.6-12.el8_10

Fixed

RHEL 9

:appstream:jq-0:1.6-12.el9_0.3.src

Fixed

RHEL 10

jq-0:1.7.1-8.el10_0.3.src

Fixed

Alpine

Fixed

edge

jq: 1.8.2-r0

Fixed

v3.21

jq: 1.8.2-r0

Fixed

v3.22

jq: 1.8.2-r0

Fixed

v3.23

jq: 1.8.2-r0

Fixed

Source: This report was generated using AI

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