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CVE-2026-63202 is an unauthenticated CPU-exhaustion denial-of-service vulnerability in the BinaryHttpParser component of Netty's netty-incubator-codec-ohttp library, specifically in the readFieldSection method of BinaryHttpParser.java (lines 619–626). The flaw allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to permanently pin Netty event-loop threads at 100% CPU by sending a crafted ~17-byte Binary HTTP (BHTTP) message encapsulated in a valid OHTTP request. All versions of io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp up to and including 0.0.22.Final are affected; the vulnerability has existed since the parser was introduced. It carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (High) (GitHub Advisory).
The root cause is a combination of CWE-835 (Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition) and CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) in BinaryHttpParser#readFieldSection. The loop condition uses fieldSectionLength != 0 instead of fieldSectionLength > 0, meaning if an attacker understates the declared field-section length, the counter goes negative and the loop never exits. Additionally, readFieldLine() can return null and consume zero bytes when a field line is truncated or over-long, causing a tight busy-spin with no state change. Two assert statements (lines 622 and 624) were the only intended guards, but Java assertions are disabled by default in production JVMs, rendering them no-ops. The vulnerability is reachable via the OHTTP codec pipeline: OHttpServerCodec.decode → OHttpRequestResponseContext.parse → ContentDecoder.decodeChunk → BinaryHttpParser.parse, with attacker-controlled plaintext passed directly after HPKE decapsulation with no intervening application-level validation (GitHub Advisory, Netty Security Advisory).
Successful exploitation causes a complete, persistent denial of service against OHTTP gateways or clients built on the affected library. Each malicious request permanently consumes one Netty event-loop thread at 100% CPU; since Netty event-loop groups have a small fixed thread count (default 2× CPU cores), a handful of requests exhausts all I/O threads, after which the service accepts no further connections and serves no traffic until the process is restarted. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact — the attack is purely an availability-class DoS with no lateral movement or data exposure risk (GitHub Advisory).
A proof-of-concept (PoC) has been publicly documented in the advisory, consisting of a 17-byte malicious BHTTP message (0001670168016101700101610162016301) that empirically reproduces the hang against the unmodified parser. No authentication or special privileges are required; OHTTP gateways publish their HPKE key configuration publicly, so any attacker can encrypt a malicious BHTTP body under the gateway's public key and submit a valid-looking OHTTP request. There is no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation or threat actor attribution at this time, and the CVE status remains "Reserved." No EPSS score or CISA KEV listing has been reported (GitHub Advisory).
netty-incubator-codec-bhttp version ≤ 0.0.22.Final. Retrieve the gateway's publicly advertised HPKE key configuration (standard OHTTP protocol behavior).0x01 (understated) but an actual field line that is longer — e.g., the hex payload 00 01 67 01 68 01 61 01 70 01 01 61 01 62 01 63 01 (framing indicator 0, method g, scheme h, authority a, path p, header a:b, partial line).BinaryHttpParser.parse().readFieldSection, where fieldSectionLength goes negative (or readFieldLine returns null with zero progress), causing a permanent busy-spin on one Netty event-loop thread at ~100% CPU.nioEventLoopGroup or epollEventLoopGroup) showing sustained ~100% CPU utilization in thread dumps; threads stuck in RUNNABLE state at io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.BinaryHttpParser.readFieldSection(BinaryHttpParser.java:626).OutOfMemoryError or memory-related errors (distinguishes this from memory-exhaustion attacks).Upgrade io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp (and the parent netty-incubator-codec-ohttp) to version 0.0.23.Final, which contains the fix (Netty Release). The fix changes the loop exit condition from != 0 to > 0 and promotes the assert statements to explicit CorruptedFrameException throws for null/zero-progress readFieldLine returns and field lines that exceed the declared length. As a temporary workaround (if upgrading immediately is not possible), deploying a rate-limiting or connection-throttling layer in front of the OHTTP gateway can reduce the attack surface, but it does not eliminate the vulnerability. Running the JVM with -ea (assertions enabled) would cause the parser to throw AssertionError instead of spinning, but this is not recommended for production due to performance implications (GitHub Advisory).
The advisory was published by normanmaurer (a core Netty maintainer) on July 18, 2026, and added to the GitHub Advisory Database on August 20, 2026. The reporter credited as "Pig-Tail" provided a high-confidence empirical reproduction including thread dumps and CPU timing evidence. No significant broader media coverage or social media discussion has been identified at this time (GitHub Advisory).
Source: This report was generated using AI
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