CVE-2026-86175
Chainguard vulnerability analysis and mitigation

Overview

CVE-2026-86175 is a credential disclosure vulnerability in NetBox (the open-source network infrastructure management tool) that causes plaintext backend credentials to be returned in REST API and GraphQL API responses. Specifically, the parameters field of Data Source objects — which stores Git HTTP(S) passwords and Amazon S3 secret access keys — is serialized verbatim to any authenticated user holding only the core.view_datasource object permission, with no write, staff, or superuser status required. All versions through 4.7.0 of netbox-community/netbox are affected. The vulnerability was reported on 19 June 2026 and publicly disclosed on 5 September 2026 after no vendor response. It carries a CVSS v3.1 score of 6.5 (Medium) and a CVSS v4.0 score of 7.1 (High) (GitHub Advisory, VulnCheck Advisory).

Technical details

The root cause is CWE-522 (Insufficiently Protected Credentials): NetBox's DataSource.parameters JSON field stores backend-specific secrets, and each backend explicitly declares which keys are sensitive (GitBackend.sensitive_parameters = ['password']; S3Backend.sensitive_parameters = ['aws_secret_access_key']), but this designation is only honored in the web UI template and changelog serialization — never in the API layer (geo-chen/oss). The REST serializer (DataSourceSerializer) includes parameters in its Meta.fields list with no to_representation override to redact sensitive keys (NetBox serializer), and the GraphQL type registers the model with fields='__all__', exposing every field including parameters (NetBox GraphQL types). This is an incomplete fix of the original issue #12625, where a prior remediation (PR #13203) only added UI-template masking and changelog masking without updating the API serialization paths (NetBox Issue #12625). Exploitation requires only a valid API token with core.view_datasource view permission — no elevated privileges, no user interaction, and no special network position.

Impact

An authenticated low-privileged user can retrieve plaintext Git HTTP(S) passwords (or personal access tokens) and AWS S3 secret access keys stored in NetBox Data Sources by querying GET /api/core/data-sources/ or the GraphQL data_source_list endpoint. These credentials typically grant access to systems entirely outside NetBox — such as source code repositories or cloud storage buckets — enabling lateral movement and potential supply-chain compromise of content synchronized from those backends. The impact is limited to confidentiality (no integrity or availability impact on NetBox itself), but the downstream exposure of external system credentials significantly amplifies the real-world risk (geo-chen/oss, VulnCheck Advisory).

Exploitability

No public proof-of-concept exploit code has been published, and there is no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation at this time (VulnCheck Advisory). The EPSS score is 0.0, reflecting the current absence of observed exploitation activity. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. However, exploitation is trivially simple for any authenticated NetBox user with view-only data source permissions, requiring only standard HTTP requests to documented API endpoints — no special tooling or exploit framework is needed.

Exploitation steps

  1. Obtain a low-privileged account: Acquire or create a NetBox user account (or API token) that has been granted the core.view_datasource object permission. No write, staff, or superuser access is required.
  2. Enumerate data sources via REST API: Send an authenticated GET request to the data sources endpoint to list all configured data sources and their types:
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Token <api_token>" \
      "https://netbox.example/api/core/data-sources/"
  3. Extract Git credentials: Filter for Git-type data sources and observe the parameters field in the JSON response, which contains the plaintext password (and username):
    "parameters": {"branch": "main", "password": "SUPER-SECRET-GIT-PW", "username": "svc-acct"}
  4. Extract S3 credentials: Filter for Amazon S3 data sources to retrieve the aws_secret_access_key:
    "parameters": {"aws_access_key_id": "AKIAEXAMPLE", "aws_secret_access_key": "S3-SECRET-KEY"}
  5. Alternatively, use GraphQL: Query the GraphQL endpoint for the same data:
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Token <api_token>" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
      -X POST https://netbox.example/graphql/ \
      -d '{"query":"{ data_source_list { name parameters } }"}'
  6. Use harvested credentials for lateral movement: Authenticate to the external Git repository using the extracted password/PAT, or use the AWS access key ID and secret access key to access the S3 bucket via the AWS CLI or SDK, gaining unauthorized access to external systems (geo-chen/oss).

Indicators of compromise

  • Network: Unusual or repeated GET requests to /api/core/data-sources/ from accounts that do not normally access this endpoint; POST requests to /graphql/ with queries containing data_source_list and parameters fields from low-privileged user tokens.
  • Logs: NetBox access logs showing core.view_datasource permission usage by non-administrative accounts; API authentication events for tokens not associated with automation or integration services querying data source endpoints.
  • Downstream Systems: Unexpected authentication attempts to Git repositories or AWS S3 buckets using credentials stored in NetBox, particularly from IP addresses not associated with the NetBox server itself; AWS CloudTrail events showing S3 access from unfamiliar IAM key IDs; Git repository access logs showing authentication from unexpected sources.
  • NetBox Audit: Review of NetBox object change logs for data source access patterns inconsistent with normal operational use (geo-chen/oss).

Mitigation and workarounds

As of the disclosure date (5 September 2026), no patched version of NetBox has been released; the advisory notes "no patch information available" (GitHub Advisory). Organizations should immediately rotate all Git passwords/PATs and AWS S3 secret access keys stored in NetBox Data Sources as a precautionary measure. As a workaround, restrict the core.view_datasource object permission to only trusted administrators who genuinely require it, and implement network-level access controls (firewall rules, API gateway policies) to limit access to the NetBox REST and GraphQL API endpoints. Audit existing API token grants to identify accounts with unnecessary data source view permissions. Monitor for a patched release from the netbox-community project that implements credential redaction in DataSourceSerializer.to_representation() and the GraphQL DataSourceType, mirroring the existing to_objectchange censoring logic (VulnCheck Advisory).

Community reactions

The vulnerability was discovered and reported by security researcher geo-chen, who disclosed it publicly on 5 September 2026 after the NetBox maintainers did not respond to follow-up communications since 17 August 2026 (geo-chen/oss). The researcher characterized this as an incomplete fix of the original issue #12625 (reported in May 2023), noting that the prior remediation only addressed UI-template masking and not the API serialization paths. VulnCheck published an advisory on the same day as disclosure (VulnCheck Advisory). No significant broader media coverage or vendor statement has been observed at this time.

Additional resources


SourceThis report was generated using AI

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