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This is a precedent-consistency report, not a novel class: the identical NAT64 well-known-prefix gap in the sibling fetch server's SSRF guard was accepted by this repository, published as GHSA-66qx-2266-pmj6, and fixed in v2.1.0 (#5238). The everything server's gzip fetch guard (tools/gzip-file-as-resource.ts) still classifies addresses in 64:ff9b::/96 as public, because the prefix is never unwrapped to the embedded IPv4 before the block-list check. Impact is contingent on a NAT64/DNS64 path that can actually reach the embedded IPv4; on ordinary networks the connection simply fails. The code comment in the guard already acknowledges the gap (disclosed below).
Affected: Product @modelcontextprotocol/server-everything (modelcontextprotocol/servers, src/everything). Confirmed in monorepo v2/main at commit 6cfff622fb8eb41e2504340d5a6105d34094143c (2026-11-11). Precedent: mcp-server-fetch in this same repository — GHSA-66qx-2266-pmj6 (originally reported as issue #5181), fixed in v2.1.0 (2026-10-24) via #5238 and tracked by maintainer in #5255. Other versions not verified. Details:
Established by code inspection against pinned tree. Classification outcome follows deterministically from guard's contents: with 64:ff9b::/96 absent from every registered non-public range, assertPermittedTarget accepts a target whose resolved address lies in that prefix, including embeddings of RFC 1918 and link-local IPv4 addresses. A unit-level exercise of the classifier mirrors the proof accepted for the fetch precedent. End-to-end connection was NOT dynamically demonstrated: no NAT64/DNS64 environment was available, and on a network without one the connection attempt simply fails. Appendix regression test (ev-k03-1_gzip-nat64-classification.test.ts, style of existing tests/gzip-private-addresses.test.ts): pins NAT64 address judged by wrapped IPv4 — embeddings of private/loopback/link-local refused, public embedding not refused for prefix alone. Verification (Node v24.22.1 / vitest 4.1.10, pinned tree): test FAILS on pinned code — 5 of 7 cases fail, tool fetched NAT64 target and returned resource_link instead of refusal (2 public controls pass). With remediation on scratch copy (unwrap 64:ff9b::/96 and classify embedded IPv4, mirroring #5238), test PASSES 7/7, existing gzip suites stay green 41/41. Test exercises classification only — DNS and fetch stubbed, no real NAT64 gateway. Full test source in reporter's evidence files, available on request.
Only in deployments where everything server runs with a NAT64/DNS64 path to internal address space: a client able to call gzip fetch tool can make server connect to embedded IPv4 targets — including private and link-local addresses — that guard is documented to refuse by default. No impact on ordinary networks. Remediation: Mirror fetch fix (#5238) in gzip guard: unwrap 64:ff9b::/96 before classification and subject embedded IPv4 to same block-list check (local-use range 64:ff9b:1::/48 is already registered; well-known prefix needs unwrap-and-check rather than flat block, so public embedded addresses keep working where NAT64 is intended path). Honest limitations:
Source: NVD
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