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wallabag has a SSRF / CWE-918 issue in download images locally, entry save, imports that create entry HTML, API content injection. DownloadImages fetches image URLs extracted from stored entry HTML through an HTTP client that lacks the SSRF protections used by the main article fetch path. This summary is defensive and intentionally omits exploit instructions.
When the global setting to download images locally is enabled, an authenticated user can cause the wallabag backend to send HTTP(S) GET requests to attacker-controlled destinations. The downloader accepts image URLs from saved entry HTML and preview-image metadata, but does not block private, loopback, link-local, or reserved network destinations. It also follows redirects without validating each destination. A public URL can therefore redirect to a private service reachable from the wallabag server. The setting is disabled by default and only a super administrator can enable it. Once it is enabled, the attacker only needs a normal authenticated account. Most requests are blind, but a response accepted as an image can be stored under a web-accessible local path and referenced by the entry. Raster images are re-encoded and SVG images are sanitized before storage; no separate SVG XSS impact has been established.
wallabag versions 2.2.0 through 2.6.15 are affected. The unreleased master branch also remains affected. No downloader exists in release 2.1.6.
wallabag 2.6.16
Keep local image downloading disabled. As defense in depth, restrict wallabag's outbound network access so it cannot reach private, loopback, link-local, reserved, or cloud metadata destinations.
The downloader processes src and descriptor-based srcset values on img elements, including a fallback img nested in picture, and separately processes the entry preview-image URL. It does not extract source srcset or CSS background URLs. Relative URLs are resolved against the entry URL.
The locked clients restrict requests to HTTP and HTTPS, so file: and gopher: URLs are not usable through the supported stacks. However, the image clients do not validate resolved or connected IP addresses, do not restrict HTTP(S) ports, do not validate redirect destinations, and do not defend against DNS rebinding. The main article fetch path uses Graby's SSRF plugin, but the image downloader uses a separate client, so those protections do not apply.
See the credits section of this advisory
Source: NVD
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