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The recipe batch_update endpoint (PUT /api/recipe/batch-update/) selects target recipes with the filter private=False OR (private=True AND (created_by=user OR shared=user)) — the same predicate used for reading. Every batch operation is then applied, including setting private itself and rewriting the recipe's share list (shared_set, shared_add, shared_remove, shared_remove_all). A user who has merely been shared a private recipe (a read-oriented grant) can therefore set private: false, making the owner's private recipe — full content, steps and ingredients — readable by every member of the space, or rewrite who the recipe is shared with. The same treatment of "shared" as full write access exists in has_recipe_permission, which grants share recipients all HTTP methods (including DELETE) on private recipes; this report focuses on the batch endpoint, where the effect is directly demonstrated. Sharing semantics elsewhere are read-oriented for comparison: RecipeBook sharing was fixed to read-only for shared users in GHSA-xvmf-cfrq-4j8f / CVE-2026-35488 ("CustomIsShared permits DELETE/PUT on RecipeBook by shared (read-only) users").
RecipeViewSet.batch_update (cookbook/views/api.py): the recipes queryset includes private recipes shared with the caller; operations then include recipes.update(private=…) when private is in the payload, and through-table rewrites for shared_set / shared_remove_all. No owner-only restriction is applied to the privacy/share operations. has_recipe_permission (cookbook/helper/permission_helper.py): for private recipes it returns (created_by == user OR user in recipe.shared) AND space matches with no method distinction, so object permissions on the detail endpoint also treat share recipients as full writers. Suggested fix: restrict the privacy- and sharing-related batch operations (and ideally all batch mutations of private recipes) to the recipe's creator: exclude shared-only recipes from those operations, i.e. apply the created_by=user predicate for private/shared_* changes, mirroring the read-only treatment of shared users adopted for RecipeBooks. Credit: Aditay Kumar (GitHub: adityasunny06help-coder)
Verified on v2.7.2 with the project's test harness (SQLite, one space, three users). Victim V owns a private recipe and shares it with user U (V does not share it with guest G). (1) GET /api/recipe/<id> as G → 403 (control: recipe is private). (2) PUT /api/recipe/batch-update/ as U with {"recipes": [<id>], "private": false} → 200. (3) The recipe's private flag is now false, and GET /api/recipe/<id> as G → 200 — the full recipe is readable by every space member. Full transcript and harness available on request.
A share recipient can strip the privacy from any private recipe shared with them, exposing its complete content to the whole space, and can alter the recipe's audience (add/remove shared users). This exceeds the read access the owner granted and cannot be reconciled with the owner's intent; the owner is not notified.
Source: NVD
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