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The voice-call Twilio webhook path accepted replay/dedupe identity from unsigned request metadata (i-twilio-idempotency-token), enabling replayed signed requests to bypass replay detection and manager dedupe by mutating only that header.
openclaw (npm)<= 2026.2.25 (latest published npm version at triage time)main: commit 1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb42026.2.26Deployments using the optional voice-call Twilio webhook path could accept replayed webhook events as fresh events when an attacker had one valid signed request and changed only the unsigned idempotency header.
The fix removes unsigned-header trust from Twilio replay/dedupe identity and binds replay/manager dedupe to authenticated request material. It also threads a verified request identity through provider parsing so dedupe uses verification-derived identity rather than mutable headers.
1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.26). After the npm release is published, this advisory can be published without additional version-field edits.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
Source: NVD
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