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Vulnerability DatabaseGHSA-mm3h-q67x-4779

GHSA-mm3h-q67x-4779: 
PHP vulnerability analysis and mitigation

Impact

The ACS endpoint (saml-sp/login) didn't check two parts of a SAML login Response, and followed an unvalidated redirect after login. 1. AudienceRestriction was not validated. An assertion the IdP issued for a different service provider could log its subject into Craft, as long as it also passed the Recipient and Destination checks. That's possible when:

  • the IdP omits SubjectConfirmationData/@Recipient (the Recipient check passes when it's absent), or
  • the other SP shares the ACS URL (for example, several SP providers on one Craft site), and
  • the Response isn't signed, or its Destination matches (an unsigned Response's Destination can be rewritten). A malicious or compromised SP that trusts the same IdP could then replay its users' assertions to log in as them on the Craft site. 2. InResponseTo was not bound to an issued AuthnRequest. The AuthnRequest ID was stored, but never compared with the Response. As a result:
  • a captured solicited Response could be replayed within its validity window, and
  • an attacker could start a login, then make a victim's browser post the attacker's Response, logging the victim into the attacker's account (login CSRF). 3. Open redirect after login (RelayState). After a successful login, the user was redirected to any URL in

RelayState, a plain form field outside the signature. On SP-initiated logins it comes from the login link's RelayState parameter and is echoed back by the IdP. A link such as https://site.example/actions/saml-sp/login/request?RelayState=https://evil.example therefore sends the user through a genuine login to an attacker's page, for example a fake "session expired, re-enter your password" form. Protocol-relative (//evil.example), userinfo (https://site.example@evil.example) and lookalike hosts were also followed.

Patches

Versions 4.3.3 and 5.2.8:

  • requires an AudienceRestriction containing this SP's Entity ID, and rejects assertions that don't have one;
  • rejects a Response, or a SubjectConfirmationData, whose InResponseTo isn't an AuthnRequest this site issued in the last hour. Each request ID is single-use and is bound to the issuing browser session when that session's cookie is present;
  • follows RelayState only to a path or an http(s) URL on the request host, a Craft site host, or a host listed in the new allowedRedirectHosts setting; any other target goes to Craft's default post-login URL. IdP-initiated (unsolicited) logins are still accepted by default. Set allowIdpInitiatedLogin to false in

config/saml-sp.php to reject them. After upgrading, if logins fail with "not a valid audience" or "no AudienceRestriction", set the IdP's audience to this site's Entity ID.

Workarounds

None in configuration. To reduce exposure until you can upgrade:

  • make sure the IdP sends Recipient;
  • sign both the Response and the Assertion (requireResponseToBeSigned, requireAssertionToBeSigned);
  • keep assertion lifetimes short at the IdP;
  • for the redirect: use EVENT_BEFORE_RELAYSTATE_REDIRECT to replace $event->redirect with a same-site URL.

Remaining limitation

While allowIdpInitiatedLogin is true, an unsolicited assertion can still be replayed within its validity window. Preventing that needs a used-assertion-ID cache, planned separately.

Unsupported versions

Patched in 4.3.3 (Craft 4) and 5.2.8 (Craft 5). Versions before 4.0 (Craft 3) are no longer maintained and won't be patched; upgrade to 4.3.3 or later.

Proof of concept

The regression tests added with the fix (tests/unit/controllers/LoginControllerTest.php) post IdP-signed Responses to LoginController::actionIndex. On unpatched versions each of these logs the user in (or, for the last one, redirects off-site); on 5.2.8 each is rejected:

  • testAssertionForAnotherAudienceIsRejected
  • testAssertionWithoutAudienceRestrictionIsRejected
  • testResponseToAnUnknownRequestIsRejected
  • testSubjectConfirmationInResponseToAnUnknownRequestIsRejected
  • testResponseToOurAuthnRequestCannotBeReplayed
  • testOffSiteRelayStateIsNotFollowed (absolute, protocol-relative, userinfo, lookalike and javascript: targets)

Source: NVD

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