Register for the AI for Security Summit: Join Figma, Perplexity & Wiz

CVE-2026-70464
rsync vulnerability analysis and mitigation

Overview

CVE-2026-70464 is a denial-of-service vulnerability in the rsync daemon that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to exhaust all available connection slots by stalling the handshake process. It affects rsync versions 2.0.0 through 3.4.4, with version 3.5.0 being the first patched release. The vulnerability was published on August 13, 2026, and was reported independently by Chamal De Silva and Michal Ruprich of Red Hat QE. It carries a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.5 (High) and a CVSS v4.0 base score of 8.7 (High) (GitHub Advisory, Microsoft MSRC).

Technical details

The root cause is improper resource allocation without throttling (CWE-770 / CWE-400): the rsync daemon forks a child process per connection but imposes no handshake deadline before or spanning the read_args() calls. Two distinct stall forms exist: (1) stalling before module selection by sending a line with no terminator — this pins a process and file descriptor but does not consume a module slot; and (2) stalling after module selection by trickling NUL-terminated arguments into read_args() one byte at a time, which holds a max connections slot and can make the module unavailable to legitimate clients. The pre-existing timeout module parameter did not mitigate this because set_io_timeout() executed after the vulnerable read_args() calls, and the default timeout value is 0 (disabled). The fix introduces a separate handshake deadline with a non-zero built-in default, active before the greeting and spanning both read_args() calls, and bounds the early-protocol argument count (GitHub Advisory).

Impact

Successful exploitation renders the rsync daemon unavailable to legitimate clients by exhausting all configured connection slots. Because no authentication is required and the attack works against anonymous modules, any internet-exposed rsync daemon is at risk. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact — the vulnerability is purely an availability issue, but it can completely block backup, synchronization, and file-transfer operations that depend on the rsync daemon (GitHub Advisory, Microsoft MSRC).

Exploitability

No public proof-of-concept exploit code has been observed, and there is no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation at this time. The vulnerability is rated automatable by NVD SSVC, meaning it can be scripted without user interaction. The EPSS score is approximately 0.57%, indicating a currently low probability of exploitation in the near term. The CVE is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog as of the time of this report (GitHub Advisory, Microsoft MSRC).

Exploitation steps

  1. Reconnaissance: Identify internet-facing rsync daemons running versions 2.0.0–3.4.4 using network scanners (e.g., Shodan, Censys, or nmap with the rsync service probe on TCP port 873).
  2. Establish multiple connections: Open a large number of simultaneous TCP connections to port 873 on the target rsync daemon, up to or exceeding the daemon's configured max connections limit.
  3. Complete the @rsyncd greeting: For each connection, send the initial @rsyncd protocol greeting to advance past the first handshake stage, ensuring the forked child process is created.
  4. Stall before module selection (pre-slot variant): Send a line with no newline terminator, causing the child to block indefinitely waiting for input — consuming a process and file descriptor without triggering any timeout.
  5. Stall after module selection (slot-exhaustion variant): Send a valid module name to claim a max connections slot, then trickle NUL-terminated arguments into read_args() one byte at a time at the minimum rate to avoid any I/O timeout, holding the slot open.
  6. Exhaust connection slots: Repeat steps 3–5 across all open connections until all max connections slots are consumed, causing the daemon to reject new connection attempts from legitimate clients with a 'max connections' error (GitHub Advisory).

Indicators of compromise

  • Network: Large number of simultaneous inbound TCP connections to port 873 from one or more source IPs; connections that remain open for an unusually long duration without completing a transfer.
  • Process: Elevated number of rsync daemon child processes in a waiting/sleeping state with no active I/O; processes persisting far beyond the expected handshake window.
  • Logs: Rsync daemon logs showing repeated connections that never progress to module authentication or file transfer; log entries indicating max connections limit reached for a module, blocking legitimate clients.
  • System: Unusually high number of open file descriptors associated with the rsync daemon process (/proc/<pid>/fd); system resource exhaustion metrics (process table, file descriptor limits) correlating with rsync daemon activity (GitHub Advisory).

Mitigation and workarounds

The primary remediation is to upgrade rsync to version 3.5.0 or later, which introduces a handshake deadline with a non-zero default that spans both read_args() calls (GitHub Release). Distribution-specific patches are available from SUSE (SUSE-SU-2026:3634-1, SUSE-SU-2026:3657-1), Fedora, and other Linux vendors. As interim workarounds: restrict access to the rsync daemon (TCP port 873) via firewall rules to trusted IP ranges; configure a low max connections value per module combined with IP-based rate limiting at the network perimeter; and deploy a load balancer or firewall that enforces TCP connection timeouts to prevent indefinite stalling (GitHub Advisory, Microsoft MSRC).

Community reactions

The vulnerability was reported independently by two researchers — Chamal De Silva (connection-holding variant) and Michal Ruprich of Red Hat QE (the read_args() argument-trickle variant) — and was addressed in a release described by the rsync project as a "major security release." Multiple Linux distributions including SUSE and Fedora issued security advisories and updated packages shortly after disclosure. No significant social media controversy or broader media coverage has been identified beyond standard security advisory channels (GitHub Advisory, GitHub Release).

Additional resources

Linux Distribution fix status

Fix availability across major Linux distributions and their releases.

Debian

Fixed

bookworm

rsync

Affected

sid

rsync: 3.5.0+ds1-1

Fixed

trixie

rsync

Affected

Ubuntu

Unknown

bionic (esm-infra)

rsync

Unknown

devel

rsync

Unknown

focal (esm-infra)

rsync

Unknown

jammy

rsync

Unknown

noble

rsync

Unknown

resolute

rsync

Unknown

trusty (esm-infra-legacy)

rsync

Unknown

xenial (esm-infra-legacy)

rsync

Unknown

RHEL / CentOS

Fixed

OpenShift

openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8

Affected

RHEL 8

rsync.src

Affected

RHEL 9

:appstream:rsync-0:3.2.7-1.el9_8.src

Fixed

RHEL 10

rsync-0:3.5.0-3.el10_2.src

Fixed

Alpine

Fixed

edge

rsync: 3.5.0-r0

Fixed

v3.21

rsync: 3.5.0-r0

Fixed

v3.22

rsync: 3.5.0-r0

Fixed

v3.23

rsync: 3.5.0-r0

Fixed

SourceThis report was generated using AI

Related rsync vulnerabilities:

CVE ID

Severity

Score

Technologies

Component name

CISA KEV exploit

Has fix

Published date

CVE-2026-70461HIGH8.8
  • rsync logorsync
  • rsync-debugsource
NoYesAug 13, 2026
CVE-2026-70464HIGH8.7
  • rsync logorsync
  • rsync-rrsync
NoYesAug 13, 2026
CVE-2026-70463HIGH8.6
  • rsync logorsync
  • rsync
NoYesAug 13, 2026
CVE-2026-85091HIGH8.3
  • rsync logorsync
  • zlib
NoYesSep 03, 2026
CVE-2026-70462HIGH7.1
  • rsync logorsync
  • rsync
NoYesAug 13, 2026

Free Vulnerability Assessment

Benchmark your Cloud Security Posture

Evaluate your cloud security practices across 9 security domains to benchmark your risk level and identify gaps in your defenses.

Request assessment

Get a personalized demo

Ready to see Wiz in action?

"Best User Experience I have ever seen, provides full visibility to cloud workloads."
David EstlickCISO
"Wiz provides a single pane of glass to see what is going on in our cloud environments."
Adam FletcherChief Security Officer
"We know that if Wiz identifies something as critical, it actually is."
Greg PoniatowskiHead of Threat and Vulnerability Management