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CVE-2026-85091 is a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the gz_vacate() function of zlib, affecting versions 1.3.1.2 through 1.3.2. It is triggered when non-blocking gzwrite() operations stall with EAGAIN and the application subsequently calls gzprintf() or gzvprintf(), causing an unchecked memmove() to write up to ~983 KB beyond the internal 16,384-byte input buffer boundary. The vulnerability was published on September 3, 2026, and assigned by VulnCheck. It carries a CVSS v3.1 score of 7.4 (High) and a CVSS v4.0 score of 8.3 (High) (GitHub Advisory, Microsoft MSRC).
The root cause (CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write) lies in how gz_write() handles its two input paths differently. When the write length is ≥ state->size, gz_write() sets strm->next_in directly to the caller's external buffer for a zero-copy deflate feed. If gz_comp() returns -1 due to EAGAIN on a non-blocking descriptor, gz_write() exits without resetting strm->next_in or strm->avail_in, leaving a stale external pointer. gzclearerr() only resets state->err and state->msg — it does not repair these fields. When gzprintf() is subsequently called, it invokes gz_vacate(), which contains a guard comparing pointers from two unrelated malloc allocations using a relational operator — undefined behavior per C11 §6.5.8p5. On glibc, the guard typically evaluates false, and memmove(state->in, strm->next_in, strm->avail_in) fires with avail_in up to 983,041 bytes against a 16,384-byte destination buffer. A public proof-of-concept with both pipe-based and socket-based variants is available (PoC Gist, zlib Source).
Successful exploitation results in a heap buffer overflow of up to ~983 KB of caller-controlled data written past the state->in allocation, causing an unconditional process crash (high availability impact) on glibc systems. The overflow source is the application's own buffer, meaning heap data adjacent to state->in — including deflate internal state and other heap allocations — is overwritten with caller-controlled content, creating a potential for arbitrary code execution (high integrity impact). Crash dumps may expose heap contents including sensitive application data (confidentiality risk). The vulnerability is scoped to the affected process; no privilege boundary crossing occurs (PoC Gist).
A public proof-of-concept exists in the form of two C programs (pipe-based and socket-based) published on GitHub Gist, demonstrating the overflow with ASAN output confirming a WRITE of 983,041 bytes (PoC Gist). The NVD SSVC assessment classifies exploitation as 'poc' with technical impact rated 'total', though automatable is 'no' due to the three required preconditions. The EPSS score is approximately 0.0044 (0.44%), indicating low current exploitation probability. There is no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation or CISA KEV catalog inclusion at this time. Three conditions must hold simultaneously: the application must use a non-blocking file descriptor for gzip output, the stalling gzwrite() call must carry at least state->size bytes, and gzprintf() must be called after gzclearerr() on the same handle before the descriptor drains.
gz_comp() to return EAGAIN when the server calls gzwrite() with a large buffer (≥ state->size bytes, typically 8,192 or 16,384 bytes).gzwrite() call exits early via the state->again path, leaving strm->next_in pointing to the caller's external buffer and strm->avail_in holding the unconsumed byte count. The server may call gzclearerr() to clear the error state, but this does not reset the stale pointer.gz_vacate() via gzprintf(): Resume reading just enough data to allow the server to proceed, then stall again. When the server calls gzprintf() or gzvprintf() on the same gzip handle (e.g., to append a chunk boundary), gz_vacate() is invoked with the stale external pointer still in place.gz_vacate() at line 387 evaluates false (due to undefined pointer comparison behavior on glibc), and memmove(state->in, strm->next_in, strm->avail_in) writes up to ~983 KB of caller-controlled data past the 16,384-byte state->in allocation, crashing the process or potentially enabling code execution depending on heap layout (PoC Gist, zlib Source).SIGSEGV or SIGABRT crashes in server processes that use zlib for gzip output; crash dumps showing a faulting address immediately after a 16,384-byte heap allocation attributed to gz_init in gzwrite.c.Z_ERRNO errors with EAGAIN/EWOULDBLOCK followed by subsequent gzprintf-related errors or abrupt process termination; ASAN output containing heap-buffer-overflow WRITE in gz_vacate gzwrite.c:393 if the binary is instrumented.Update zlib to a version newer than 1.3.2 once an official patch is released by the zlib project. Microsoft has issued a security update addressing this CVE as part of its September 2026 Patch Tuesday for affected Microsoft products (Microsoft MSRC). As a workaround, applications using zlib for gzip output should avoid calling gzprintf() or gzvprintf() after a non-blocking write stall without fully resetting the gzip stream state, or should avoid using non-blocking file descriptors with the gz* API. Vendors and downstream distributors (e.g., Yocto Project, Chainguard) should apply available patches from their respective security channels. Review all applications bundling zlib 1.3.1.2–1.3.2 and prioritize updating those that use non-blocking gzip write operations.
Mark Adler (zlib maintainer) engaged directly with the PoC author on the GitHub Gist, asking clarifying questions about the F_SETPIPE_SZ requirement for macOS reproducibility, indicating active upstream awareness of the issue (PoC Gist). The vulnerability was covered in BleepingComputer's September 2026 Patch Tuesday roundup, which noted 966 flaws addressed by Microsoft. The Yocto Project security mailing list discussed the issue across multiple threads, reflecting concern among embedded Linux distributors. VulnCheck served as the assigning CNA, and the issue was tracked by ENISA's EUVD database as EUVD-2026-70301.
Fix availability across major Linux distributions and their releases.
bookworm
zlib
sid
zlib: 1:1.3.dfsg+really1.3.2-4
trixie
zlib: 1:1.3.dfsg+really1.3.1-1+deb13u1
bionic (esm-apps)
zsync
bionic (esm-infra)
rsync
devel
zlib
focal (esm-apps)
zsync
focal (esm-infra)
rsync
jammy
zlib
jammy (esm-apps)
zsync
noble
zlib: 1:1.3.dfsg-3.1ubuntu2.3
Source: This report was generated using AI
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